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SUMMARY 
This dissertation looks at the position of the unmarried father in South Africa with 
regard to obtaining access to his illegitimate child. The writer has focused on three 
distinct eras in South African family law: the position of unmarried fathers in terms of: 
the common law; Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act; and the 
Children’s Act. The writer has further focused on a case study. This is to emphasis 
the difficulty which unmarried fathers have when attempting to go through the courts 
to have access to his child.  
In terms of South African common law, fathers of illegitimate children did not have 
any form of parental authority over the child. The mothers of illegitimate children have 
full parental authority over such children. Access in terms of South African common-
law is seen as an incident of parental authority. Unmarried fathers nevertheless had 
the right to approach the high court to obtain access to their children, if the mother of 
the child refuses to allow the father to have such access. In the late 1980’s and early 
1990’s, there was an overwhelming amount of applications brought by unmarried 
fathers in the high courts so as to obtain access to their illegitimate children. The 
case of Van Erk v Holmer 1992 (2) SA 636 (W) sparked victory for unmarried fathers 
when the learned judge held that all unmarried fathers of children have an inherent 
right of access to their children. This victory was short-lived. Subsequent case law 
and in particular the case of B v S 1995 (3) SA 571 (A) enforced the common law 
and held that unmarried fathers do not have an automatic right to their illegitimate 
children and that such fathers will have to apply to the high court for such access. 
Due to the increase in litigation in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s regarding a 
father’s access to his child born out of wedlock the Natural Fathers of Children Born 
out of Wedlock Act commenced on 4 September 1998. The South African legislature 
adopted the approach taken in the case of B v S 1995 (3) SA 571 (A) and rejected 
the approach taken in the case of Van Erk v Holmer 1992 (2) SA 636 (W) ie the 
common law continued to remain the approach taken in South Africa. 
Legislators recognised that the approach taken in the Natural Fathers of Children 
Born out of Wedlock Act does not conform to the provisions of the African Charter of 
the Rights and the Welfare of the Child, the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child and equality and dignity provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa. On 19 June 2006, the Children’s Act was effected and will commence 
once promulgated in the Government Gazette. The writer then determines whether 
the Children’s Act has in practice changed the position of the unmarried father. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation focuses on the legal position of unmarried fathers and children born out of 
wedlock. This dissertation centres around such fathers attempting to obtain access to their 
children when the mother of the child refuses to allow any access. This dissertation is based 
on a case study which will be referred to as “K v B” brought in the Witwatersrand Local 
Division and the “Application for the Adoption of BD” in the Randburg Children’s Court. The 
case study is used to illustrate, when weighed against the South Africa law during its different 
stages (ie common law and different changes of legislation), whether a father of a child born 
out of wedlock would have been successful to bring such access application. It must be 
noted that throughout the dissertation the word “contact” is used interchangeably with 
“access” and “care” is used interchangeably with “custody”. 
The focus of the case study is to further indicate to the reader the impact of a natural father 
bringing an application in the high court to access his child which has been born out of 
wedlock. The emotional turmoil and the costs of bringing such an application are immense. 
Before 1998, the access application would have been based on common law, currently the 
application is based on the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act 86 of 1997 
and at a date still to be announced, the application will be based on the Children’s Act 38 of 
2005. 
2. CASE STUDY 
2.1 Introduction 
This case study is interesting as the respondent and the respondent’s husband (see fig 1) 
took the firm stance that no access will be granted and all applications brought by the 
applicant will be vigorously opposed. It becomes clear from the beginning of the application 
that no settlement would be reached between the respondent and the applicant. The 
applicant initially took the stance to merely apply for access but due to the respondent’s firm 
stance and attitude of “no settlement”, the applicant vigorously defended the adoption 
application of BD which was brought by the respondent’s husband (see fig 2). 
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Figure 1: High Court Access Application 
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Figure 2: Application for Adoption in the Children’s Court 
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2.2 The parties to the case study 
In this dissertation the parties are referred to as follows: The natural father of the minor child 
is referred to as “the applicant”, the natural mother of the minor child is referred to as “the 
respondent”, the minor child is referred to as “BD”, and the respondent’s husband is merely 
referred to as “the respondent’s husband” or “her husband”. The case numbers have 
intentionally not been referred to. 
2.3 Basis of the case study 
The respondent is the natural mother of the minor child, BD (born K, previously B) born on 15 
January 1999. The applicant is the natural father of BD. The respondent and applicant were 
never married and the relationship between the respondent and applicant terminated in 
2001. The respondent met her husband in 1998 and married him in terms of South African 
law in 2004. The respondent has 2 children with her husband, born in 2002 and 2005 
respectively.  
In August 2004, the respondent’s husband, with the support of the respondent, applied for 
the adoption of BD in terms of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 through the Randburg 
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Children’s Court. As required by the Child Care Act, the respondent informed the applicant of 
the adoption application.1 The applicant withheld his consent to BD’s adoption by the 
respondent’s husband.  
In February 2005, the applicant launched an access application under the Natural Fathers of 
Children Born out of Wedlock Act in the Witwatersrand Local Division for access to BD. This 
access application was vigorously opposed by the respondent. 
The facts of the case appear in the court papers of both the access application and the 
adoption application and have been set out hereunder in detail. 
2.4 Facts set out in terms of the pleadings presented in the Witwatersrand Local 
Division and Randburg Children’s Court 
The applicant and respondent met in Harare, Zimbabwe in 1992 and commenced a 
relationship.2 The parties remained involved with each other until 1996, when the respondent 
left for the United Kingdom.3 In 1998, the respondent returned to Harare, Zimbabwe, and the 
relationship between the applicant and respondent continued.4 In April 1998, the respondent 
fell pregnant with BD.5 
On or about 13 October 1998, the respondent and applicant were engaged and moved into a 
common residence together.6 In or about October/November 1998, the respondent started 
working for her husband.7 On 15 January 1999, BD was born. The applicant bonded with BD 
immediately, and on 8 February 1999, the applicant and respondent registered BD under the 
applicant’s surname. The respondent acknowledged the applicant as BD’s biological father.8 
In 2001, the relationship between the respondent and the applicant deteriorated. However, 
the applicant continued to have a strong relationship with BD. On or about 5 July 2001, the 
respondent requested the applicant to move out of the common residence.9 At this stage, BD 
was 2-and-a-half years old. 
The respondent’s husband separated from his wife in June 2001 and commenced divorce 
proceedings against her in July 2001.10  
In August 2001, the applicant started paying maintenance to the respondent for BD11 in an 
amount of Zimbabwean $5,000.00. Even though the applicant was paying maintenance, the 
maintenance agreement was orally concluded and no formal maintenance agreement was 
                                                 
1  S 18(4)(d) of the Child Care Act. 
2  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 13 (p 8); respondent’s answering affidavit par 24 (p 60). 
3  Ibid. 
4  Ibid. 
5  Ibid. 
6  Ibid. 
7  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 17 (p 9); respondent’s answering affidavit par 28 (p 62). 
8  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 13 (p 8). 
9  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 19 (p 9); respondent’s answering affidavit par 30.2 (p 63). 
10  Respondent’s answering affidavit par 31.5 (p 65). 
11  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 26. 
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ever signed between the parties regulating maintenance payments. On or about October 
2001, the respondent unilaterally re-issued BD’s birth certificate in her maiden surname. The 
applicant was unaware of the name change.12 
According to the respondent, she became involved with her husband in September 2001.13 
However, accordingly to the applicant, the respondent and her husband were seeing each 
other before the respondent requested the applicant to vacate the common home in July 
2001.14 The applicant believed that the respondent’s husband was the cause of the 
deterioration of his relationship with the respondent and there were a number of altercations 
between the respondent’s husband and the applicant after July 2001.15 16  
From July 2001, the respondent allowed the applicant to have sporadic access to BD.17 Due 
to the altercations between the applicant and the respondent’s husband; and the complete 
deterioration of any form of civil relationship between the applicant and the respondent, on or 
about November 2001, the respondent sought professional help of a psychologist, Dr B 
regarding BD’s welfare when BD was in the care of the applicant.18 
A single incidence between the applicant and the respondent occurred on 1 December 2001 
in front of BD. The applicant had overnight access to BD from 30 November 2001 to 1 
December 2001. The respondent collected BD from the applicant, at the applicant’s parent’s 
home. According to the respondent, the applicant smelled of alcohol. The respondent 
collected BD and placed BD into the car seat in her vehicle. The applicant demanded from 
the respondent a time when he will see BD again and removed BD from the respondent’s 
vehicle. The respondent was unable to remove BD from the applicant’s arms. The 
respondent was able to call on the applicant’s mother for help. The applicant’s mother was 
able to remove BD from the applicant’s arms and handed BD to the respondent.19 Due to this 
incidence, the applicant was only allowed to have supervised access to BD at the 
respondent’s residence.20 
The applicant continued to pay maintenance for BD directly to the respondent. The 
applicant’s maintenance obligations increased from Zimbabwean $5,000.00 to Zimbabwean 
                                                 
12  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 23 (p 10); applicant’s answering affidavit par 26.1 (p 61) & par 36.2 (p 
71); respondent’s answering affidavit in consequence of applicants amended application par 6 (p 343). 
13  Respondent’s answering affidavit par 29 (p 63). 
14  Applicant’s replying affidavit par 3.32 (p 175). 
15  The applicant admitted that he was angry and resentful towards the respondent and that his anger was 
directed towards the respondent’s husband. However, the applicant in terms of the pleadings informed the 
high court that such anger was never directed towards BD.  
16  In terms of Annexure A attached to the family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005, the report of the family 
counselor (p 21) states that “the applicant admitted that he had arguments with the respondent’s husband 
on a few occasions. This was because he was angry about the relationship between them and when it was 
obvious that the respondent was being unfaithful to him.” 
17  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 22 (p 10). 
18  Respondent’s answering affidavit par 49.5 (p 79). 
19  Respondent’s answering affidavit par 49.8 (p 80). 
20  Respondent’s answering affidavit par 32.10 (p 68). 
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$10,000.00.21 It must be noted that maintenance payments, especially with regard to the 
duration of maintenance paid, the period in which maintenance was paid, the person to 
whom maintenance was paid, as well as the amount was strongly disputed between the 
parties. 
In February 2002, the respondent’s husband divorced his wife.22 In March 2002, the 
respondent allowed the applicant to have unsupervised access to BD.23 In April 2002, the 
respondent’s husband expanded his business into South Africa.24 
On 6 April 2002, the respondent and her husband were going on a two-week vacation to 
South Africa. The respondent allowed the applicant to have access to BD for a two-week 
period from the evening of 5 April 2002 and BD was to reside with the applicant and his 
parents at their home. On the evening of 5 April 2002 the applicant discovered that the 
respondent had fallen pregnant with her husband’s child. In the early hours of the morning of 
6 April 2002, the respondent and her husband travelled to the Harare International airport by 
car. The applicant waited for them and trailed them to the airport. The respondent’s husband 
stopped the vehicle when they became aware that the applicant was following them. The 
respondent’s husband got out of the vehicle and approached the applicant to ask him why he 
was following them. Without warning, the applicant physically assaulted the respondent’s 
husband. Thereafter, the respondent’s husband and the respondent approached a police 
station and reported the incident. The respondent and her husband were escorted by a 
police reservist to the applicant’s parent’s home to collect BD. When the applicant’s father 
found out what had happened, a physical fight broke out between the applicant and his 
father. The applicant was arrested and was charged with “conduct likely to provoke a breach 
of peace”. The applicant paid an admission of guilt fine and was realised. According to the 
respondent this physical incident between the applicant and his father occurred in front of 
BD. Accordingly to the applicant and his family, it is denied that the physical incident between 
the applicant and his father was witnessed by BD.25 
The applicant has denied that he has ever physically abused BD or placed BD in danger or 
harmed BD in any manner.26 
                                                 
21  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 28 (p 10) and respondent’s answering affidavit par 40 (p 73). 
22  In terms of the social worker, K&A Adoptions, report dated 29 November 2004, presented to the Randburg 
Children’s Court in the adoption of BD by the respondent’s husband, the respondent’s husband indicated 
that the reason for the divorce between himself and his ex-wife was that his ex-wife strongly felt that she 
did not want to have children (p 7 of the report).  
23  Respondent’s answering affidavit par 32.10. 
24  Respondent’s answering affidavit in consequence of applicant’s amended application par 17.14 (p 351). 
25  Respondent’s answering affidavit par 32.8-32.15 (p 67-69) & par 49.10 (p 81). Also see respondent’s 
supplementary affidavit to the respondent’s answering affidavit Annexure BCD17A (p 261); family 
advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005 par 8 (p 21). 
26  Family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005 par 7 (p 22) & par 8 (p 23). 
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Due to the incident above, the respondent refused the applicant access to BD. Due to what 
the applicant referred to as the “respondent’s obstructive behaviour”, the applicant placed all 
maintenance payments for BD into a trust account.27 
On 19 June 2002, the respondent through her attorneys at the time, informed the applicant 
that he may have access to BD every Wednesday from 17h00 to 19h00 on condition that the 
applicant together with the respondent attend psychologist sessions with the respondent’s 
psychologist, Dr B. The applicant was also to pay for all psychologist consultations that the 
respondent and the applicant utilise with Dr B.28 
In July 2002, the respondent and her husband moved in together.29 
On 3 July 2002, at the insistence of the respondent, the applicant consulted with Dr B. Dr B 
recommended to the respondent that the applicant is not to have access to BD for a period of 
3 weeks so that he may assess the applicant.30 On 10 July 2002, the applicant commenced 
consultations with Dr B.31 An amount of Zimbabwean $3,500.00 was spent per session. The 
applicant attended four sessions with Dr B in July 2002. On or about 31 July 2002, at the end 
of the fourth session, Dr B recommended that the applicant has supervised access to BD 
once a week for two hours from 17h00 to 19h00 at the respondent’s residence in the 
presence of a third party.32  
On or about 1 August 2002,33 7 August 2002,34 and 14 August 2002, on each day the 
applicant exercised two hours access to BD from 17h00 to 19h00 at the applicant’s parents’ 
home. The applicant bathed, changed and fed BD. The applicant felt that he had fully 
bonded with BD and has secured a good father/son relationship with BD. 
On 14 August 2002, the respondent informed the applicant that the amount of maintenance 
paid by the applicant in respect of BD, which amounts to Zimbabwean $10,000.00 per 
month, is minimal and requested that maintenance payments by the applicant be 
increased.35 On 22 August 2002, the respondent informed the applicant through the offices of 
her attorneys that all of BD’s maintenance payments are to be paid through her attorneys of 
record.  
                                                 
27  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 29 (p 11) & 30 (p 11). 
28  Respondent’s answering affidavit BCD 10 (p 145). 
29  K&A Adoptions report p 3 (supra n 22); respondent’s answering affidavit in consequence of applicant’s 
amended application par 21.12 (p 359). 
30  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 37 (p 12); respondent’s answering affidavit par 49.11 (p 82). 
31  Applicant’s replying affidavit Annexure SHK 20 (p 219). 
32  Respondent’s answering affidavit par 50.2 (p 82). 
33  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 47.1 (p 15). 
34  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 47.2 (p 15). 
35  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 47.3 (p 15). 
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On 24 August 2002, the applicant had a motor vehicle accident in which he hit a pedestrian. 
The pedestrian died on the scene.36 The pedestrian was intoxicated and had walked across 
the road in a busy intersection. It seems from the pleadings that the applicant was never 
prosecuted for such incident. 
On 3 October 2002, the applicant increased BD’s maintenance payments from Zimbabwean 
$10,000.00 to Zimbabwean $12,500.00.37 The respondent rejected the applicant’s 
maintenance payment, as the respondent stated it was verbally agreed that the applicant’s 
payments would increase to Zimbabwean $17,500.00.38 
On 11 October 2002, the applicant paid an amount of Zimbabwean $41 935.43 (including 
interest) which was invested in a trust account to the respondent for BD’s maintenance for 
the months April, May, June and July 2002.39  
On 17 October 200240 and 24 October 2002,41 the Applicant attempted to telephonically 
contact the respondent as he wanted access to BD. The applicant was unable to contact the 
respondent. On 27 October 2002, the respondent allowed the applicant to exercise access to 
BD for a nine-hour period from 9h00 to 18h30.42 
On 17 October 2002, the respondent gave birth to her husband’s first child.43 On 18 October 
2002, the applicant learned from a mutual friend that the respondent had given birth to her 
husband’s first child.44 
On 31 October 2002, according to the respondent, she informed the applicant that she will be 
moving with BD to South Africa in January 2003. According to the applicant, the respondent 
had informed him that she will be going to South Africa with BD on holiday.45 
The respondent indicated in a subsequent letter to her attorneys of record that she was 
under the impression that the applicant had no objections to her leaving with BD to join her 
husband in South Africa.  
In November 2002, the crèche where BD attends indicated that BD was behaving 
aggressively and had a very defiant behaviour.46  
                                                 
36  Respondent’s supplementary affidavit to the respondent’s answering affidavit par 6.4 (p 257). Also see 
applicant’s supplementary affidavit par 16 (p 294) and Annexure SHK 17 (p 264); applicant’s 
supplementary affidavit par 16 (p 294). 
37  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 31 (p 11). 
38  Respondent’s answering affidavit par 43.2. 
39  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 30 (p 11). 
40  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 47.5 (p 15-16). 
41  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 47.7 (p 16). 
42  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 47.8 (p 16). 
43  K&A Adoptions report p 4 (supra n 22). 
44  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 47.6 (p 16). 
45  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 48 (p 17); Annexure SHK 11 attached to the applicant’s founding affidavit 
(p 40); respondent’s answering affidavit par 8.8 (p 50); respondent’s answering affidavit in consequence of 
applicant’s amended application par 7.2 (p 343). 
46  Respondent’s answering affidavit par 50.4 (p 83). 
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On 7 November 2002, the respondent allowed the applicant to have access to BD for a 2-
hour period from 17h00 to 19h00.47 On 10 November 2003, the respondent allowed the 
applicant to have access to BD for 5-and-a-half hours from 11h00 to 16h30.48 
On 24 November 2002, the applicant had access to BD and took BD to a birthday party.49 On 
26 November 2002, the applicant presented the respondent with a letter allowing her to 
remove BD from Zimbabwe on a holiday visa and requested the South African High 
Commission to grant the respondent such visa. 
On 28 November 2002, BD’s great-grandfather had turned 80 years of age and the applicant 
had arranged with the respondent that he would exercise access to BD so that they could 
celebrate BD’s great-grandfather’s birthday. The applicant arrived at the respondent’s 
residence at 17h00 to collect BD. Neither the respondent nor BD was at the respondent’s 
residence. The applicant telephoned the respondent at 17h10 and the respondent advised 
that she had unilaterally terminated the applicant’s access to BD.50 
On or about the beginning of December 2002, the respondent informed her attorneys that 
she had unilaterally terminated the applicant’s access to BD.51 The respondent stated that 
the applicant’s own behaviour such as exercising his access to BD at irregular intervals, 
drinking alcohol excessively, not complying with BD’s routine, ignoring BD’s eating habits, 
and his aggressiveness and hostility towards the respondent’s husband, has made her 
decide that it was not in BD’s best interests to allow the applicant access to BD.52 The 
allegations made by the respondent were denied by the applicant. 
The applicant avers and believes that the reason for the respondent’s severe attitude 
towards the applicant’s access to BD, is that BD bonded with the applicant and as a 
consequence thereof it would have been difficult for BD to deal with the lack of access if the 
respondent merely stopped such access and left for South Africa. The respondent wanted to 
stop such access in an environment which was familiar to BD such as the respondent’s 
residence.53 
                                                 
47  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 47.9.2. 
48  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 47.10. 2. 
49  Applicant’s replying affidavit par 3.60.6 (p 133). 
50  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 47.11. See Annexure SHK 11 attached to the applicant’s founding 
affidavit; respondent’s answering affidavit in consequence of applicant’s amended application par 7.2 (p 
343). 
51  In terms of Annexure A attached to the family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005, the report of the family 
counselor (p 19) states that “[a]t the end of 2002, the respondent made a decision to move to South Africa 
without informing the applicant or obtaining his permission. The respondent then made a calculated 
decision and took the risk of withholding the minor child from the applicant.” 
52  In terms of Annexure A attached to the family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005, the report of the family 
counselor (p 19) states that “the Respondent alleged that the applicant’s state of mind was not good and 
she knows it not to be true”. 
53  In terms of Annexure A attached to the family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005, the report of the family 
counselor (paginated page 21) the applicant further stated he did not want to contact the minor child 
directly after the respondent’s husband and the respondent left Zimbabwe “as he did not want to cause him 
more trauma than what he was already experiencing at the time”. 
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On 5 December 2002, the applicant received a letter from the respondent, dated 22 
November 2002, recording that the respondent and her husband informed the applicant of 
their immigration to South Africa and that the applicant had “no objection” to removing BD 
from Zimbabwe. The applicant denies that he agreed to the respondent removing BD from 
Zimbabwe and had confirmed to his attorneys of record that he did not agree to such 
removal as this would have hampered his access to BD. The applicant further confirms that 
he signed a letter in which he had agreed that BD may be removed out of Zimbabwe only on 
condition that the trip to South Africa was a holiday and that he had provided permission for a 
holiday visa.54 55  
On 6 December 2002, BD’s crèche released a report stating BD has become aggressive, 
defiant and disobedient.56 The respondent blamed the applicant for BD’s behaviour and this 
justified her decision to unilaterally stop the applicant’s access to BD. 
On 13 December 2002, the applicant consulted with Dr B. Dr B recommended that the 
applicant should have access to BD on a regular basis, on condition that the applicant does 
not consume alcohol within 48 hours of seeing BD, that the applicant collect and fetch BD at 
the agreed location and time, and that the applicant is to properly feed BD when the 
applicant has access to BD. This was the last consultation that the applicant had with Dr B. 
On 27 December 2002, the respondent left Zimbabwe and immigrated to South Africa with 
BD.57  
On 2 January 2003, the applicant paid maintenance directly to the respondent’s attorneys.58 
On 2 January 2003, the applicant was informed through a letter received from the 
respondent’s attorneys that the respondent left Zimbabwe for South Africa on 28/29 
December 2002 and that the respondent has instructed that she will not allow any access to 
BD, as she does not believe that it is in BD’s best interests.59 
The maintenance cheque paid on 2 January 2003 to the respondent was never cashed and 
the applicant was advised that all maintenance payments were to be paid to the respondent’s 
husband’s company in Zimbabwe. The maintenance cheque paid to the respondent’s 
husband’s company in Zimbabwe was further never cashed.60 The applicant continued to pay 
maintenance, at the agreed rate, into a trust account. 
                                                 
54  Applicant’s replying affidavit par 3.61.1 (p 200) & par 3.62 (p 201). 
55  In terms of Annexure A attached to the family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005, the report of the family 
counselor (p 18) states that “in December 2002, the respondent asked the applicant’s permission to take 
the minor child to South Africa for Christmas shopping. The applicant withheld consent”.  
56  Respondent’s answering affidavit Annexure BCD 13 (p 152). 
57  Applicant’s founding affidavit Annexure SHK 11 (p 40). 
58  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 32. 
59  Applicant’s replying affidavit par 3.68 (p 202). 
60  Applicant’s founding affidavit par 33. 
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On 7 January 2003, the applicant launched an urgent chamber application for access to BD. 
The pleadings were served on the respondent’s attorneys61 and they indicated that they have 
been given instructions to vigorously defend the urgent chamber application. On 10 January 
2003, an urgent chamber application was heard. The judge was of the view that it was in 
BD’s best interest that the applicant should have access to BD, however the court required 
full details of the whereabouts of the respondent and BD and if they would ever return to 
Zimbabwe.62 
On 14 January 2003, the respondent’s attorneys informed the applicant that the respondent 
had instructed them that: 
? she had moved with BD to South Africa permanently and will not be returning to 
Zimbabwe; 
? the respondent’s husband had secured permanent employment in South Africa; 
? she had informed the applicant that they would be moving to South Africa and he had 
no objection thereto 
? access by the applicant to BD was not in the best interests of BD as the applicant 
consumes alcohol, collects BD with a hangover, is constantly late for the collection 
and the dropping off of BD, and on all occasions when the applicant has had access 
to BD, BD has returned home ill. 
The respondent indicated that the applicant has no concern for BD and should not be given 
access to BD.63 
In terms of the respondent’s letter dated 14 January 2003, she had provided the residential 
address in South Africa to which she had moved with her husband and BD. It must be further 
noted that 4 months later, the respondent, her husband and BD moved from this residential 
address.64  
On 23 January 2003, the urgent application was postponed sine die. A letter was produced 
from the South African High Commission indicating that in terms of the South African 
immigration law mothers of natural children born out of wedlock need not apply for consent 
from the natural father to apply for a residence permit. It was further argued that the 
respondent’s and BD’s passports were endorsed with the necessary stamp to indicate that 
                                                 
61  Respondent’s answering affidavit par 70; applicant’s replying affidavit Annexure SHK 22 (p 236). 
62  Applicant’s replying affidavit Annexure SHK 23 (p 238). 
63  Annexure SHK 11 attached to the applicant’s founding affidavit (p 40); applicant’s answering affidavit par 
10.8, 33.10, 34 & 35. 
64  In terms of the family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005, the respondent alleges that she informed the 
applicant that she was moving to South Africa in 2002. The applicant made no effort to see or contact the 
minor child. There were no Christmas or birthday cards or gifts (par 5 p 19 of the family advocate’s report). 
The applicant concedes that he had the respondent’s address but after she moved from the address he 
had no way of contacting the respondent (par 11 p 27 of the family advocate’s report). The family advocate 
further noted that the respondent returned 4 or 5 times to Zimbabwe but did not see the necessity of 
contacting the applicant par 11 (p 28) of the family advocate’s report.  
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they had applied for permanent residency. This would indicate that the respondent and BD 
had immigrated to South Africa.65 
On 5 February 2003, the respondent’s attorneys produced notarised copies of the 
respondent’s and BD’s passports in which it was indicated that the respondent and BD had 
been given temporary residence by the South African government and that they had applied 
for permanent residence.66 Due to the evidence produced by the respondent’s attorneys of 
record, it was clear that the application for access was brought in the wrong jurisdiction. The 
applicant’s attorneys of record served and filed a notice of withdrawal of action. 
On or about April 2003, the respondent, her husband and BD had moved from the address 
which was provided to the applicant on 14 November 2003.67  
On 29 December 2003, the applicant had a confrontation with S (the respondent’s uncle) at a 
casino in Kariba. The applicant enquired from S whether he has had any contact with the 
respondent. Accordingly to the respondent, the applicant then bad-mouthed her and sent his 
friends to intimidate and coerce S and his wife.68 The applicant has admitted that he met S 
and his wife by chance in Kariba and enquired about the respondent’s whereabouts, as he 
wanted to determine BD’s residence. However, the applicant denies the remainder of the 
allegations as set out by the respondent.69 
On or about 2 April 2004, the respondent and her husband married according to South 
African law.70 On 20 June 2004, the respondent’s husband, with the support of the 
respondent, applied for the adoption of BD.71 On or about 31 July 2004, the respondent 
telephonically informed the applicant that the respondent’s husband wanted to adopt BD and 
informed the applicant that she requires his permission for such an adoption.72  
On or about 31 July 2004, the applicant’s girlfriend, F, and her stepfather laid charges 
against the applicant for assault with grievous bodily harm and malicious damage to 
property.73 The allegation was made that the applicant broke F’s arm during an incident 
between herself and the applicant. It seems that this allegation was made, so as to inform 
the high court that the applicant has a continuous violent streak and his behaviour is not in 
                                                 
65  Applicant’s replying affidavit SHK 24 (p 239). 
66  Respondent’s answering affidavit par 10.7; Annexure BCD 3 (p 133 & 134). 
67  Respondent’s answering affidavit in consequence of applicant’s amended application par 17.16 (p 351). 
68  Respondent’s supplementary affidavit to the respondent’s answering affidavit Annexure BCD 18 which is 
S’s affidavit (par 6.1 & 7 (p 267 & 268)); applicant’s supplementary affidavit par 24.5 (p 303-304). 
69  Applicant’s supplementary affidavit par 24.5 (p 303-304). 
70  In terms of Annexure A attached to the family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005, the report of the family 
counselor (p 20). 
71  K&A Adoption report (supra n 22). Notice for an order for the adoption of a child born out of wedlock; 
respondent’s answering affidavit Annexure BCD 4 (p 136-137). 
72  Respondent’s answering affidavit par 10.11 & par 79. As per the requirement in terms of s 18(4) of the 
Child Care Act. 
73  Respondent’s supplementary affidavit to the respondent’s answering affidavit par 7.1.2, 7.1.3 & 7.1.5 (p 
258); Annexure BCD 17 (p 262). 
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BD’s best interests. The respondent and her husband approached private investigators in 
Harare, Zimbabwe to investigate the applicant.74  
The applicant admitted to the altercation between himself, F and her stepfather. However, he 
denies that he hit F or broke her arm.75 The applicant stated that he attempted to break off 
the relationship with F and an argument ensued between him and F. When the argument 
broke out, the applicant was situated outside the F’s premises. According to the applicant, 
F’s stepfather approached the applicant and hit the applicant through the gate. The gate then 
opened and the applicant hit F’s stepfather back. F then started hitting the applicant, as a 
result of which she broke her little finger.76 The applicant further indicates that the parties got 
back together after this incident.77  
2.5 Proceedings brought in the Randburg children’s court and Witwatersrand Local 
Division 
On 3 August 2004, the respondent contacted the applicant again in an attempt to convince 
him that BD’s adoption by the respondent’s husband would be in BD’s best interests, and to 
obtain the applicant’s consent to her husband’s adopting BD.78 The applicant indicated 
telephonically to the respondent that he will give such permission on condition that the 
respondent will allow him access to BD.79 80 The respondent refused to agree to allow such 
access to BD.  
On 5 August 2004, the applicant was served by the sheriff, Harare81 with the notice of 
adoption with attached affidavit attested to by the respondent.82 The notice informed the 
applicant that the respondent has given her consent to the respondent’s husband’s adoption 
of BD. The notice further allows the applicant a period of 14 days to withhold or give his 
consent to the respondent’s husband for the adoption of BD, to provide reasons to the court 
why his consent should not be dispensed with, and gives the applicant the opportunity to 
                                                 
74  In terms of Annexure A attached to the family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005, the report of the family 
counselor p 23 states that “[t]he Respondent’s husband hired an investigator to investigate applicant’s past 
as the applicant had knocked down a pedestrian and killed him, broke his ex girlfriend’s arm, assaulted his 
ex girlfriend’s father and alleged that the dockets and files of the applicant went missing from the police 
station”. 
75  Family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005 par 8 (p 24). 
76  Applicant’s supplementary affidavit par 19 (p 296-298); family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005 par 11 
(p 29). 
77  Applicant’s supplementary affidavit par 19.13 (p 299). 
78  In terms of s 18(4)(d) of the Child Care Act, consent is required for an adoption from both the mother and 
the father of a child born out of wedlock. Only a father who has acknowledged himself in writing to be the 
natural father and has made his whereabouts and identity known will be such a natural father in terms s 
18(4)(d).  
79  Respondent’s answering affidavit par 10.11. 
80  It must be noted that in terms of South African adoption law, an adoption will not be granted based on 
conditions. Consent must be given without any conditions attached thereto. If conditions have been 
attached to the consent, it is viewed as the consent has been withheld by the relevant party. 
81  In term of s 19(A)(1) the manner of service has not been prescribed. In terms of regulation 6 of the 
Regulations made in terms of section 60 of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 (“Child Care Act Regulations”), if 
the manner of service has not been prescribed, the notice or the summons can be served by any means.  
82  Respondent’s answering affidavit par 10.11 & Annexure BCD 4 (p 135). 
The position of unmarried fathers in South Africa: an investigation with reference to a case study 
- 13 - 
apply for the adoption of BD.83 The adoption application was brought through the jurisdiction 
of the children’s court in Randburg, as BD was living in the Randburg jurisdiction.84 
The applicant through his South African attorneys of record filed and served a notice of 
intention to defend. His attorneys of record further informed the respondent’s attorneys of 
record that the adoption will not be defended or consent withheld, if access arrangements 
can be agreed to. The respondent responded by stating that she will not grant the applicant 
access to BD and all applications brought in terms of the Natural Fathers of Children Born 
out of Wedlock Act will be vigorously defended. 
On 6 December 2004, the applicant’s attorneys of record were served with a notice for the 
applicant to appear in the Randburg Children’s Court on 25 January 2005.85 The notice 
requests the applicant to provide reasons why his consent should not be dispensed with.86  
Due to the short notice provided by the clerk of the children’s court, Randburg, the applicant 
was unable to obtain a visa to enter into South Africa. On 20 December 2004, the applicant’s 
attorneys of record through correspondence, requested a postponement.87  
On 25 January 2005, the applicant requested the children’s court, Randburg, to postpone the 
matter so that the applicant is given the opportunity to appear in court as he was unable to 
obtain a visa to enter South Africa, as well as the opportunity to launch an access application 
in terms of the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act. The postponement was 
vigorously defended by the respondent, stating that this claim was a “spurious claim and a 
stratagem to delay the due determination of the adoption proceedings”.88 The commissioner 
postponed the matter to 1 March 2005 to give the applicant such an opportunity. 
On 2 February 2005, the applicant served on the respondent’s attorneys of record an urgent 
access application in terms of the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act 
brought in the Witwatersrand Local Division.89 On the same date, the respondent’s attorneys 
of record served a notice of opposition. 
                                                 
83  S 19A(1) of the Child Care Act. Such notice was required to be brought by the respondent’s husband, as in 
terms of section 19(A)(2) the applicant had acknowledged himself in writing as being the natural father of 
BD and had registered himself as being the father of BD on BD’s birth certificate (s 19(A)(2) of the Child 
Care Act). 
84  As per s 18(1)(a) of the Child Care Act. 
85  The notice was received by registered post. In terms of regulation 6 of the Child Care Act Regulations, a 
notice in terms of s 19(A) of the Child Care Act must be sent via registered post.  
86  Respondent’s answering affidavit par 10.16; annexure BCD 5 (p 138-139); K&A Adoption report (supra n 
22).  
87  Applicant’s replying affidavit Annexure SHK 17 (p 214 - 215). 
88  Respondent’s affidavit attached to the notice of counterclaim. 
89  In terms of Annexure A attached to the family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005, the report of the family 
counselor p 21 states that “the Applicant wants a relationship with the minor child and wants him to know 
who his father is and to see him growing up and play a role in the life of the minor child”. 
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On 3 February 2005, the applicant further served the access application, as well as an 
Annexure B,90 on the family advocate and requested the family advocate through a letter to 
conduct urgent interviews with the applicant, the respondent, the respondent’s husband and 
BD, as the matter was brought on an urgent basis. 
On 4 February 2005, the respondent served on the applicant a notice to provide security in 
terms of section 47 of the Uniform Rules of Court.91 The request for security was based on 
the fact that the applicant was a Zimbabwean citizen and resided in Zimbabwe. The applicant 
is viewed as a peregrinus, as he does not permanently reside in South Africa, nor does he 
own land in South Africa.92 The security requested was in an amount of R 75,000.00. On 10 
February 2006, the applicant’s attorneys of record served a notice of intention to oppose the 
quantum requested.93  
On 11 February 2005,94 the respondent served her answering affidavit. On 14 February 
2005, a round table meeting commenced between the applicant, the applicant’s attorneys of 
record and the respondent’s attorneys of record. The respondent was not present. The 
respondent’s attorneys of record made it clear that the respondent did not believe that 
access to BD by the applicant is in BD best interests and the respondent had instructed that 
they will not agree to allow the applicant to have access to BD.95 No settlement was 
reached.96 On 15 February 2005, the respondent’s attorneys of record requested that the 
applicant submit himself to full psychological testing by psychologist R.97 On 16 February 
2005, the family advocate requested that, due to the allegations regarding alcohol abuse by 
                                                 
90  In terms of s 3(1) of the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act “the Family Advocate shall, 
after an application has been lodged for – 
 (a) an order granting access rights to or custody or guardianship of a child born out of wedlock under 
section 2; or 
 (b) variation, rescission or suspension of such order, 
 If so requested by any party to such proceedings or the court concerned, institute an enquiry to enable 
him/her to furnish the court at the hearing of such application with a report and recommendations on any 
matter concerning the welfare of the child concerned regarding any matter as is referred to him or her by 
the court”. 
 In the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act , the family advocate is defined in s 1 as the 
family advocate appointed under s 2(1) of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987 
(“Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act”). 
 A request as per s 3(1) of the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act is submitted in terms of 
the Regulations in terms of section 5 of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act . 
91  Uniform Rules of Court under the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. 
92  Harms Civil Procedure in the Supreme Court par D7. 
93  It is clear from the facts of the matter that the applicant is a peregrinus of South African (as he is a 
Zimbabwean citizen) and liable to provide security as requested in terms of rule 47(1) of the Uniform Rules 
of Court. However, in terms of s 47(3) of the Uniform Rules of Court, if the party on which the notice of 
security had been served is liable to pay security but believes that the amount requested is excessive, that 
party can demand from the party requesting the amount to draw up and tax the drawn bill of costs. 
94  Filing sheet attached to respondent’s answering affidavit (p 44-45). 
95  In terms of Annexure A attached to the family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005, the report of the family 
counselor (p 19) states that “the respondent is totally against the minor child having a relationship with the 
applicant and will do everything in her power to protect the minor child from the applicant”. 
96  Respondent’s supplementary affidavit to the respondent’s answering affidavit par 10.1 (p 259). 
97  Applicant’s supplementary affidavit to the respondent’s answering affidavit SHK 19 (p 269). 
The position of unmarried fathers in South Africa: an investigation with reference to a case study 
- 15 - 
the applicant, that the applicant submit himself for CDT alcohol testing. The results of the 
CDT alcohol testing were in the normal range.98  
On 16 February 2005, the applicant’s attorneys of record informed the respondent’s 
attorneys of record that the applicant no longer disputed the quantum as set out in the Rule 
47 application and an amount of R75 000.00 had been placed in a section 76(2A) trust 
account. The respondent’s attorneys of record accepted the quantum, as well as the way the 
security was set up.99 
On 17 February 2005, the applicant, his father, the respondent’s husband, the respondent 
and BD attended personal interviews with the family advocate and family counsellor at the 
Office of the Family Advocate, Johannesburg.100 
On 18 February 2005, the applicant’s attorneys of record informed the respondent’s 
attorneys of record that the applicant would not be seeing the respondent’s selected 
psychologist and have elected to see a psychologist selected by the applicant’s attorneys of 
record.101 
On 21 February 2005, the applicant served on the respondent his replying affidavit.102 The 
following documentation was further served on the applicant: the respondent’s counter-
application103 and the respondent’s supplementary affidavit to the respondent’s answering 
affidavit.104 
On 22 February 2005, an urgent access application was heard in the Witwatersrand Local 
Division. The court held that the matter was not urgent and struck the matter from the roll for 
non-urgency. The applicant was ordered to pay for the costs of urgency.105 
On 1 March 2006, the 2nd hearing of the adoption of BD continued in the Randburg 
Children’s Court. The applicant’s attorneys of record argued for a 2nd postponement based 
on the fact that the applicant matter was struck from the urgent roll in the Witwatersrand 
Local Division and that the applicant will be launching the access application in the normal 
course. It was further argued that the applicant will be amending his papers to apply not only 
for access to BD but also for guardianship106 of BD.107 The commissioner held that the matter 
                                                 
98  Applicant’s replying affidavit par 3.59.3 (p 197); family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005 par 11 (p 34); 
Annexure B to the family advocate’s report. 
99  Applicant’s replying affidavit Annexure SHK 18 (p 216). 
100  Family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005 Annexure A p 2. Applicant’s replying affidavit par 3.11 (p 
168); respondent’s supplementary affidavit to the respondent’s answering affidavit Annexure BCD 20 (p 
272). 
101  Applicant’s supplementary affidavit Annexure X9 (p 327). 
102  Applicant’s replying affidavit (p 154). 
103  Respondent’s counterapplication (p 243–254). 
104  Respondent’s supplementary affidavit to the respondent’s answering affidavit (p 255-260). 
105  Outside cover of the court file. 
106  As set out by s 1(2) of the Guardianship Act 192 of 1993. 
107  Applicant amended founding affidavit to access application; respondent’s answering affidavit par 8.8; 
applicant’s supplementary affidavit par 9.8 (p 286); respondent’s answering affidavit in consequence of 
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is to be postponed to 12 May 2005, so that the applicant be given the opportunity to apply for 
guardianship of BD though the Witwatersrand Local Division. The Randburg Children’s Court 
held the reason for granting such a postponement is that the high court is the upper guardian 
of the minor child and the high court must first decide the issue of guardianship before the 
adoption can continue in the Randburg Children’s Court.108 
On 15 April 2005, the applicant’s attorneys of record served a notice of intention to apply for 
leave to amend in terms of rule 28.109 The amendment sets out changes to the notice of 
motion whereby the applicant applies to the high court to grant the applicant and the 
respondent joint guardianship110 of BD. The amendment further sets out how the applicant 
would exercise his access to BD. It is clear from the papers that the applicant requested that 
access to BD be implemented gradually, as BD had not seen the applicant in a 3-and-a-half-
year period.111 The respondent did not object to the rule 28(1) amendment112 and it came into 
effect on 26 April 2005, when the amended pages where effected on the respondent.113  
The parties exchanged further pleadings114 in which the respondent maintains that the 
applicant does not have the child’s best interests at heart and that the applicant is not 
suitable guardian for the child. The applicant asserts that the respondent’s husband is a New 
Zealand citizen and gave up his Zimbabwean citizenship in 1999.115 The applicant had fears 
of the respondent’s husband, the respondent and BD immigrating to New Zealand in the near 
future. If the applicant was successful in his access application it would be an empty victory 
as the respondent could remove BD from South Africa. If successful, the access application 
would secure the applicant access to BD and a guardianship order would ensure that the 
respondent does not remove BD from South Africa without the applicant’s permission. 
Furthermore, the applicant had continued to pay BD’s maintenance directly into a trust 
account in Zimbabwe, which amounted to a substantial amount, if living in Zimbabwe. In 
support of his guardianship application, the applicant requested the Court to grant him 
guardianship so that he could handle BD’s affairs in Zimbabwe.  
                                                                                                                                                        
applicant’s amended application par 6 (p 343); the applicant’s postponement application and affidavit in the 
adoption proceedings. 
108  K&A Adoption report (supra n 22).  
109  Rule 28(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court states that “any party desiring to amend a pleading or document 
other than a sworn statement, filed in connection with any proceedings, shall notify all other parties of his 
intention to amend and shall furnish particulars of the amendment”. 
110  S 2(1) of the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act allows the natural father of a child born 
out of wedlock the right to apply for access, custody and guardianship of the child born out of wedlock. 
111  Notice of intention to apply for leave to amend in terms of rule 28 (p 17-22 of the index to notices); 
applicant’s supplementary Annexure X1 (p 308-313); respondent’s answering affidavit in consequence of 
applicant’s amended application par 10 (p 344). 
112  In terms of rule 28(2) of the Uniform Rules of Court, any party who wishes to object to the amendment 
must do so within 10 days from the date that the amendment was delivered. If no objection is received 
within the 10-day period, the amendment will be effected. 
113  As set out in rule 28(7) of the Uniform Rules of Court.  
114  On 19 April 2005, the applicant served on the respondent the respondent’s supplementary affidavit. (p 278 
-279). 
115  Respondent’s answering affidavit in consequence of applicant’s amended application par 17.12 (p 350). 
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The respondent denied the allegations made by the applicant that she and her husband will 
be leaving South Africa to immigrate to New Zealand, stating their home is South Africa. She 
further indicated that all of their personal and business interests are in South Africa and they 
have no intention of immigrating to New Zealand.116 The respondent further argued that the 
amount of monies situated in a trust account in Zimbabwe do not amount to much in South 
African terms, and this does not warrant the court granting the applicant guardianship of BD. 
On 11 May 2005, the family advocate served and filed their report. The family advocate’s 
report was in favour of the applicant obtaining access117 and joint guardianship118 of BD. The 
family advocate further recommended that the adoption process be deferred.119 The family 
advocate stated that the applicant seeks to be appointed as joint guardian of BD and without 
such application the respondent remains sole guardian and custodian of BD.120 The family 
advocate further went on to state that the applicant would have a right to “participate on an 
equal basis with the respondent on issues incidental to guardianship only”.121  
The family advocate further went on to state: 
“From the investigation into this matter it was clear that the applicant loves the minor child and 
has the minor child’s interest at heart. His interests have been sustained throughout the 
investigation”.122  
On the issues pertaining to the altercations between the applicant, the respondent and the 
respondent’s husband, the family advocate went on to state: 
“Misguided on some issues the applicant might be, this is no disqualification. The applicant will 
in future be a significant and meaningful presence in the minor child’s life if access is allowed as 
recommended”.123 
The family advocate went on to say regarding joint guardianship:  
“I could see no justification to deprive the minor child of the benefit of assistance in litigation and 
the administration of his property by the applicant, be it then only property acquired from the 
applicant and his family. Had the parties been married, the minor child would have been entitled 
to such assistance. I have no doubt that the respondent’s husband has a very good relationship 
with the minor child and also has assisted the respondent immensely in the past, but this should 
not be to the exclusion of the applicant”.124 
                                                 
116  Family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005 par 8 (p 23). 
117  Family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005 par 10.3 (p 15). The family advocate stipulated that 
reasonable access is to be phased in, as set out in the applicant’s amended notice of motion.  
118  Family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005 par 10.2 (p 15). 
119  Family advocates report dated 11 May 2005 par 10.1 (p 15). 
120  Family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005 par 9 (p 13). 
121  Ibid. 
122  Ibid. 
123  Ibid. 
124  Ibid. 
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The family counsellor further indicated in the family advocate’s report that the respondent 
wilfully and intentionally kept BD away from the applicant and by the respondent’s own 
admission she did not want BD to have a relationship with the applicant and she would do 
“everything she could as a mother to protect the minor child”125 from the applicant. However, 
the respondent informed the family advocate and the family counsellor that, if from the age 
10 years BD wanted to know his biological father, they would not stop him.126 However, the 
family advocate and family counsellor are adamant that the respondent would not inform BD 
of the applicant’s existence and that the applicant would become a faded memory.127 The 
family counsellor recommended that access should be granted on the condition that it is 
monitored and supervised. Access should occur every 6 weeks or less depending on the 
applicant being able to enter into South Africa.128 The family counsellor further recommended 
that the applicant be appointed as joint guardian of BD.129  
On 12 May 2006, Randburg Children’s Court postponed the adoption of BD to 2 August 
2006. The applicant’s attorneys of record argued that the issue of guardianship and access 
must be decided by the high court first before the adoption application can be heard in the 
Children’s Court, Randburg. The respondent’s attorneys of record argued that the cases of T 
v C130 and Haskins v Wildgoose131 clearly indicate that an adoption does not bar an access 
application in the high court. It was argued that the guardianship application was a ludicrous 
application and that the applicant will do everything in his power to ensure that the adoption 
application does not continue and this was clear indication that the applicant does not have 
BD best interests at heart. The commissioner indicated that the Children’s Court has no 
jurisdiction regarding guardianship and postponed the matter to 2 August 2005, so that the 
applicant is given the opportunity to change his pleadings to reflect the application for joint 
guardianship.  
On 2 June 2005, the access and guardianship application was set down on the opposed 
motion roll for hearing. The applicant argued that the entire matter must be referred to oral 
evidence, as throughout the pleadings there were many disputes of facts. The respondent 
conceded that that the access application be referred to oral evidence, although she argued 
that the guardianship application can be dealt with on the papers as there was no dispute of 
fact. After hearing argument regarding whether the guardianship application should be 
referred to oral evidence, the court held that the access application, due to a clear dispute of 
fact, should be referred to oral evidence. However, the guardianship application is to be 
heard by the court on the given day. Issues relating to the best interest of the child were 
                                                 
125  Family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005 par 11 (p 34). 
126  Family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005 par 11 (p 34). 
127  Ibid. 
128  Family advocates report dated 11 May 2005 par 12.1 (p 36). 
129  Family advocate’s report dated 11 May 2005 par 12.2 (p 36). 
130  2003 (2) SA 298 (W). 
131  [1996] 3 All SA 446 (T). 
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argued in the context of pertaining to the narrow definition of guardianship, issues 
surrounding the maintenance monies in the trust account in Zimbabwe, what land is owed in 
Zimbabwe by the applicant, to what extent BD will benefit from the applicant being a joint 
guardian of BD, whether the applicant has been part of BD’s life, how long BD and the 
applicant have been apart, whether the applicant has shown any interest in BD’s life prior to 
the launching of the access and guardianship application. The issue of unfair discrimination 
based on the equality clause was attempted to be argued on behalf of the applicant, but the 
court rejected issues pertaining to constitutionality. After hearing argument and considering 
the family advocate’s recommendations, the court held that the family advocate’s 
recommendations are merely recommendations and need not be considered by the court. 
The court further held that the applicant was denied the right to be joint guardian of BD. 
However, pending the trial of the access application, the respondent and her husband may 
not remove BD from South Africa. 
On 2 August 2005, the adoption application of BD by the respondent’s husband continued in 
the Children’s Court, Randburg. The applicant informed the commissioner that he was not 
granted joint guardianship of BD, but nevertheless attempted to postpone the matter based 
on the Children’s Bill.132 It was argued that in terms of section 21 of the new Children’s Bill, 
the applicant would obtain automatic rights of access to BD. If the adoption is granted in 
favour of the respondent’s husband, all rights and obligations between the applicant and BD 
would be severed. This would mean that the applicant’s rights in terms of section 21 of the 
Children’s Bill would no longer be in effect. The applicant would merely be considered as an 
“interested person” and would have to launch an application for access in terms of section 24 
of the Children’s Bill. This would mean that the applicant would be in the same position as he 
finds himself currently. It was argued by the respondent’s attorneys of record that the case 
law indicates that adoption is no bar to an access application and the high court will still 
remain the upper guardian on minor children. The commissioner dismissed the applicant’s 
request for postponement stating that she is not bound to legislation which may or may not 
come into being, she is bound by the current law as it stands. The hearing of the adoption of 
BD commenced. After examination and cross-examination of the social worker that drafted 
the report, as set out by section 18(1)(b) of the Child Care Act and rule 21 of the Child Care 
Act Regulations, and the respondent’s husband, the adoption hearing of BD was postponed 
to 20 September 2005. 
On 20 September 2005, the respondent was unable to attend the second hearing for the 
adoption of BD, as she was due to give birth to her third child. The adoption proceedings 
continued with the cross examination of the applicant and his father. The applicant in cross 
examination indicated that he had BD’s interests at heart and that he wanted BD to know him 
                                                 
132  Children’s Bill 70D of 2003 found on http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/ci/plr/pdf/bills/B70D-03.pdf visited on 21 
June 2006. 
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as his father. He wanted to bond and have a relationship with BD. The applicant further 
testified that he understands that the respondent’s husband has been BD’s father since BD 
was 3 years old and has looked after BD and the respondent. However, he believed that he 
could be a part of the BD’s life. The matter was further postponed to 21 and 23 February 
2006, to give the respondent the opportunity to give evidence.  
The applicant’s attorneys of record applied for a trial date. The trail date was set for 2 August 
2006. The respondent’s attorneys of record launched an application in terms of rule 47(6) of 
the Uniform Rules of Court, in terms of which they requested more security in an amount of 
R100 000.00 in addition to the security already held in trust. This request was made on 
notice and set down for taxation. The applicant’s attorneys of record attended the taxation of 
the bill of costs and the taxing master ordered that an amount of R100 000.00 in total 
(including the monies held in trust) is to be paid by the applicant and held in the same 
manner as previously agreed by the parties.  
On 21 February 2006, the legal representatives of the applicant, the respondent and 
respondent’s husband commenced with the examination and cross examination of the 
respondent. The respondent clearly indicated in her testimony that she will do everything in 
her power to ensure that BD’s world remains as it is, to the exclusion of the applicant. This 
includes vigorously defending any applications brought by the applicant in any forum. The 
respondent further indicated that she will inform BD of the applicant’s existence but informed 
the court that this date will not be a date in the future. The respondent indicated that if BD 
determines through a third party that the applicant is BD’s father she will inform him of the 
applicant’s contact details.  
It is clear from the respondent’s and her husband’s testimony that BD is unaware that the 
applicant is his father and regards the respondent husband as his father. 
On 21 February 2006, the applicant’s attorneys of record requested the children’s court to 
call the family advocate as a witness of the court and to consider family advocate’s report. 
The applicant’s attorneys of record based their request on rule 21(7) of the Child Care Act 
Regulations which provides that the children’s court may consider “the report of any other 
person who can form an authoritative opinion on any matter relevant to the application”. The 
children’s court denied the applicant’s request and held that if any party to the proceedings 
wishes to call the family advocate they may do as their own witness. 
On 23 February 2006, the applicant’s attorneys of record called the family advocate.  
On or about March 2006, the Children’s Court, Randburg held that the respondent’s husband 
was successful in the adoption of BD. All rights and obligations which the applicant had with 
regard to the BD terminated.  
The position of unmarried fathers in South Africa: an investigation with reference to a case study 
- 21 - 
In or about July 2006, the applicant formally withdrew his access action against the 
respondent, as he was unable to pay the costs of the security ordered by the taxing master. 
The parties agreed that each party was to pay for their own costs.  
3. THE LEGAL POSITION OF UNMARRIED FATHERS: THE COMMON LAW 
3.1 Introduction 
South African common law distinguishes between children born in wedlock133 and children 
born out of wedlock.134 A child born of a valid marriage is a child born to a man and woman 
who were validly married135 at the time of the birth of their child or subsequently got married 
to each other after the birth of their child.136 137 A child born out of wedlock is a child born to a 
man and woman who were not validly married at the time of the birth of their child or who did 
not get married to each other thereafter.138 The legal consequences attached to 
differentiating between such children and fathers of such children are notable. 
3.2 Standing of a father of child born out of wedlock at common law 
The mother of an illegitimate child has full custody139 and guardianship140 (parental 
authority141) over her illegitimate child.142 Harms J in F v L 143 simply affirms that “a mother … 
acquires her parental authority by reason of birth”. In law, a child can never be considered 
illegitimate in relation to its mother.144 This legal position is based on the maxim “een moeder 
maakt geen bastaard”.145  
On the other hand, the law regards the father of a child born out of wedlock as a stranger to 
his child.146 The father of an illegitimate child does not have the inherent right of guardianship 
or custody over his minor child, even if the mother of the illegitimate child dies.147 Margo J 
                                                 
133  Also known in South African Law as a legitimate child. 
134  Also known in South African Law as an illegitimate child. 
135  A valid marriage between a man and a woman.  
136  In terms of s 11 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992, any parent or guardian of a child 
born out of wedlock whose parents have married each other may apply , after the registration of the child’s 
birth, to the director-general to amend the registration of the child’s birth as if his or her parents were 
married to each other at the time of the child’s birth. After the child has become of age, such child may 
apply himself or herself. 
137  S 4 of the Children’s Status Act 82 of 1987. 
138  Cronje & Heaton Law of Persons 45. 
139  Clark Family Law Service E40. 
140  Clark Family Law Service E32. 
141  Parental authority “refers to the rights, powers, duties and responsibilities that parents have towards their 
children and those children’s property” Cronje & Heaton South African Family Law 265. 
142  If the mother of the illegitimate child is a minor herself, her guardian becomes the guardian of the 
illegitimate child until the mother of the illegitimate child reaches the age of majority or is emancipated in 
terms of a court order. The mother of the illegitimate child will still have custody over the child. Van 
Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and Family 394; 405; Boberg Persons and Family 333. The high 
court of South Africa is the upper guardian of minor children and if an application is brought by an 
interested party regarding the guardianship and custody of the illegitimate child, the court will consider the 
application and will make an order which is in the best interests of the child.  
143  1987 (4) SA 525 (W). 
144  Van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and Family 390. 
145  In F v L 1987 (4) SA 525 (W) 527 H–I, Harms J states that a mother “can not make a bastard”. 
146  Clark Family Law Service par E24. 
147  Sinclair assisted by Heaton Marriage Vol 1 288.  
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held in Ex Parte Van Dam148 that even though it was held as obiter in Rowan v Faifer149 that 
“the father of an illegitimate child has no right to custody, he has locus standi to appear on 
the question of custody”.150 Margo J went on to state that “the same reasoning would apply to 
guardianship”. Only if it is in the interests of the minor illegitimate child, may the courts grant 
custody and/or guardianship to the natural father”.151 However, the court must firstly 
determine whether granting such custody and/or guardianship would be in the best interests 
of the child.152 
An illegitimate child automatically acquires the surname of the mother.153 However, a child 
which is born out of wedlock can acquire the surname of the father, if the father has 
acknowledged in writing that he is the father of the child (ie the father acknowledges paternity 
of the child) and both mother and father jointly apply for the child to be registered under the 
surname of the father.154 
A father of a child born out of wedlock does not have an inherent right of access to his minor 
child,155 and if access is denied by the mother of the minor child, the father’s only right of 
recourse is to a apply to the high court for access to the minor child. Only if the court believes 
and has determined that such access is in the best interests of the child, will the natural 
father of a child born out of wedlock be granted such access.156  
In terms of common law, a child born out of wedlock automatically acquired its mothers 
domicile. However, legislation has intervened and in terms of the Domicile Act 3 of 1992, a 
child acquires the domicile of the place to which he or she is most closely connected. The 
Domicile Act does not distinguish between a child born in or out of wedlock. 
The father of a child born out of wedlock has a duty to support his or her child157 and such 
child has the right to be supported by his natural father.158 In other words, both the mother 
and father of the child have a duty to support their child159 according to their means and 
                                                 
148  1973 (2) SA 182 (W). 
149  Rowan v Faifer 1953 (2) SA 705 (E). 
150  Margo J in Rowan v Faifer 1953 (2) SA 705 (E) rejected the decision in Docrat v Bhayat 1932 TPD 125 
whereby the court held the father of an illegitimate child has no legal claim to the child and has no locus 
standi regarding the custody of the child. 
151  Rowan v Faifer 1953 (2) SA 705 (E) 184 -185. 
152  Rowan v Faifer 1953 (2) SA 705 (E). 
153  Sinclair assisted by Heaton Marriage Vol 1 288. Cronje & Heaton Law of Persons 59; Van Heerden et al 
Boberg’s Law of Persons and Family 394; Births and Deaths Registration Act s 10(1)(a).  
154  The father of the child enters his particulars in the child’s notice of birth (Births and Deaths Registration Act 
s 10(1)(b)); Cronje & Heaton Law of Persons 63-64; Van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and 
Family 396; Sinclair assisted by Heaton Marriage Vol 1 288. 
155  In Van Erk v Holmer 1992 (2) SA 636 (W) it was held that a father has an inherent right of access to his 
child born out of wedlock. However, in subsequent cases and most importantly in the case of B v S 1995 
(3) SA 571 (A) it was decided that a natural father of a child born out of wedlock has no inherent right of 
access. These cases are discussed in detail below. 
156  B v S 1995 (3) SA 571 (A; F v L 1987 (4) SA 525 (W); Rowan v Faifer 1953 (2) SA 705 (E). 
157  Lamb v Sack 1974 (2) SA 670 (T) 673. 
158  F v L 1987 (4) SA 525 (W) 527 A–B. 
159  Cronje & Heaton South African Family Law 291. 
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according to the child’s needs.160 This duty of support extends to the estates of both parents. 
No distinction is made between a child born in or out of wedlock. 
In the case of Petersen v Maintenance Officer; 161 the natural father’s duty of support was 
extended to paternal grandparents, only if the natural father of a child born out of wedlock 
does not have the means to support the child. Fourie J in Petersen v Maintenance Officer162 
held that the common law, applied in the case of Motan v Joosub,163 whereby the paternal 
grandfather of an extra marital child has no duty of support164 is unconstitutional, based on 
the violation of the constitutional  rights of equality165 and dignity.166 
It is clear from the above that the parental duty of support is not linked to parental authority 
over the child. In the case of F v L, Harms J held that the “right of access is not a quid pro 
quo for payment of maintenance”. 167 
3.3 Natural fathers of children born out of wedlock and the issue of access at common 
law 
A father of a child born out of wedlock does not have an inherent right of access to his minor 
child and if access is denied by the mother of the minor child, the father’s only right of 
recourse is to a apply to the high court for access to the minor child. It has been conceded 
that the father of a child born out of wedlock has the locus standi to apply to the high court for 
such access.168 Only if the court believes that it is in the best interests of the child,169 will it 
allow the natural father of a child born out of wedlock such access. 
It must be noted that from the decision of Fletcher v Fletcher170 the best interests of the minor 
child is the paramount consideration in deciding any dispute between the parents with regard 
to custody and access. The best interests test allows the court to focus on the rights of the 
child rather than the rights of the parents.171 
                                                 
160  Boberg Persons and Family 338; Lamb v Sack 1974 (2) SA 670 (T) 673. 
161  2004 (1) All SA 117 (C); 2004 (2) BCLR 205 (C). Also reported as Petersen v Maintenance Officer, 
Simon’s Town Maintenance Court 2004 (2) SA 56 (C). 
162  Ibid. 
163  Motan v Joosub 1930 AD 61. 
164  Ibid. 
165  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa , 1996 s 9. 
166  Constitution  s 10. 
167  F v L 1987 (4) SA 525 (W) 527B. 
168  Van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and Family 406; Sinclair assisted by Heaton Marriage Vol 1 
114; Douglas v Mayers 1987 (1) SA 910 (Z); F V L 1987 (4) SA 525 (W). 
169  Since the decision in Fletcher v Fletcher 1948 (1) 130 (A) the best interest of the minor child has been the 
paramount consideration in deciding any dispute between the parents with regard to custody and access. 
In terms of s 28(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (the “Constitution”) the best 
interests of the child are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child. In terms of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child the best interests of the child is one of paramount 
considerations, whilst in the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child the best interest of the 
child is the paramount consideration.  
170  B v S 1995 (3) SA 571 (A); F v L 1987 (4) SA 525 (W); Rowan v Faifer 1953 (2) SA 705 (E). 
171  De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 416. 
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The common-law position regarding a natural father’s access has been confirmed on appeal 
in the case of B v S.172 There was considerable dissension regarding the father’s access to 
his child born out of wedlock. In the decision of Van Erk v Holmer,173 Van Zyl J held that a 
father of a child born out of wedlock has an inherent right of access to the child. Whilst in 
other decisions subsequent to 174 and preceding175 the decision of Van Erk v Holmer,176 case 
law leaned towards the conclusion that a father of such a child born out of wedlock does not 
have an inherent right of access. 
In the case of Van Erk v Holmer,177 Van Zyl J held that the father of a child born out of 
wedlock has an inherent right of access to his minor child. He came to this decision by 
analysing Roman and Roman-Dutch authorities and determined that such authorities were 
silent on the issue of rights of access by a father of a child born out of wedlock. He went on 
to determine that “it may safely be assumed that no such right was ever considered”178 by 
such authorities. Van Zyl J went on to justify his decision by focusing on public policy. He 
determined that public policy dictated that there should be no distinction between fathers of 
children born in or out of wedlock179 and that many fathers of children born out of wedlock 
want to be part of their children’s lives and form a bond with their children but due to the 
South African legal position many fathers are denied this right.180 The learned judge held that 
such father should have an inherent right of access and that these automatic rights should 
only be denied if there is a clear indication that it is not in the child’s best interests.181 Van Zyl 
J based his decision on what he believed would be just and reasonable, that it would 
conform to public policy and that all fathers would be placed on an equal footing before the 
law.182  
Van Zyl’s J decision was heavily criticised and was not followed by subsequent case law, as 
will be seen below. 
In S v S,183 Flemming DJP held that he was not bound to the decision made in Van Erk v 
Holmer, as Van Zyl J did not follow the stare decisis rule.  
Flemming DJP in S v S184 was referring to the full-bench decision in B v P,185 where it was 
held that the father of a child born out of wedlock does not have an inherent right of access, 
                                                 
172  B v S 1995 (3) SA 571 (A). 
173  Van Erk v Holmer 1992 (2) SA 636 (W). 
174  S v S  1993 (2) SA 200 (W); F v L 1987 (4) SA 525 (W). 
175  B v P  1991 (4) SA 113 (T). 
176  Van Erk v Holmer 1992 (2) SA 636 (W). 
177  Ibid. 
178  Van Erk v Holmer 1992 (2) SA 636 (W) 637 J. 
179  Van Erk v Holmer 1992 (2) SA 636 (W)  649 E. 
180  Van Erk v Holmer 1992 (2) SA 636 (W)  649 H–I. 
181  Ibid. 
182  Van Erk v Holmer 1992 (2) SA 636 (W)  649 J. 
183  1993 (2) SA 200 (W).  
184  Ibid. 
185  1991 (4) SA 113 (T). 
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that the father of the child born out of wedlock must prove on a balance of probabilities that 
such access would be in the best interests of the child, and such relief does not unduly 
interfere with the mother’s parental rights.186 Kirk Cohen J in B v P187 emphasised that the 
best interests of the child is of paramount importance and is the most important 
consideration188 when determining whether a father of child born out of wedlock should have 
access to his child. Kirk-Cohen J followed the case of F v L189 where it was held that parental 
power is vested in the mother of a child born out of wedlock and that the father of such child 
has no inherent right of access. Kirk-Cohen J further held that the case of Matthews v 
Haswari190 is not authority for the view that a father has automatic rights of access.191 The 
court in B v P followed the decision in Douglas v Mayers,192 where the court held that it will 
not unduly interfere with the mother’s parental authority.193 
Flemming DJP in S v S194 held that he could not deviate from the decision in B v P195 and 
held that the decision delivered by Van Zyl J in Van Erk v Holmer was incorrect.196 He further 
considered Van Zyl J’s interpretation of the Roman and Roman-Dutch Law authorities and 
held that his interpretation thereof was incorrect. Van Zyl J clearly stated that, if there is no 
authorities that deal with access by a father to his illegitimate child, there was a strong 
indication that such right did not exist.197  
The matter regarding the access of a father to his child born out of wedlock was finally 
settled by the Appellate Division (now known as the Supreme Court of Appeal) in B v S.198 B 
v S was an appeal from the decision of Spoelstra J in the court a quo of B v S 1993 (2) SA 
211 (W). Howie J in B v S199 held that the common law in South Africa must be followed 
unless the common law has been altered by “judicial exposition”.200 Howie J then went on to 
analyse the common law through case law.201 He held that the father of a child born out of 
wedlock does not have an inherent right of access, and that the best interests of the child are 
the main criteria to consider before allowing access. 
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Howie J then progressed to the decision of Van Zyl in the case of Van Erk v Holmer.202 
Howie J clearly points out that the learned judge in Van Erk v Holmer  was requested by the 
parties to provide a judgement, even though the parties had already agreed to settle the 
matter according to the family advocate’s recommendations.203 The learned judge went on to 
state that the reasons provided by Van Zyl J were merely an opinion, as there was no longer 
a lis between the parties.204 
Howie J differed in opinion from Van Zyl’s interpretation of the Roman and Roman- Dutch 
authorities. He clearly indicated that parental power over a child born out of wedlock vests in 
the mother of the child, and access is a consequence of or incidental to parental authority. 
The father of a child born out of wedlock does not have parental authority over such child 
and therefore has no inherent right of access. 205 The learned judge however, went on to 
state that a father of a child born out of wedlock has the locus standi206 to apply for access to 
the minor child though the high court. The most important consideration that the court will 
take into account is the best interests of the child and whether such access is in the bests 
interests of the child.207  
Howie J then considered whether the father of a child born out of wedlock was discriminated 
against as he was not given the inherent right of access to his child.208 The court looked at 
English case law and concluded that only if access is in the best interests of the child will 
access be granted and stated that “the child’s welfare is thus the central, constant factor in 
every insistence”.209 The learned judge went on to state that the right of access is the right of 
the child and not the right of the parent.210 The court was further of the view that the father of 
a child born out of wedlock is not unfairly discriminated against as the father of a legitimate 
child will also have to approach the court, if the mother of the child does not allow access. 
The court did consider the fact that a father of a legitimate child has an inherent right of 
access whilst the father of a child born out of wedlock does not have such a right.211 
Howie J then considered what the court would take into account when determining what 
would be in the best interests of the child when determining access by a father to his child 
born out of wedlock. Howie J stated that the court must consider the following when 
determining what would be in the best interests if the child when determining access: the 
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degree of commitment which the father has shown to the child,212 the degree of attachment 
which the father and the child have between them213 (ie the bond between the child and the 
father), and the reasons why the father has applied for such access.214 
The learned judge further held that where the access application is being heard for the first 
time there is no onus in the sense of an evidentiary burden and this type of litigation requires 
judicial investigation.215 
3.4 Natural fathers of children born out of wedlock and the issue of adoption 
Adoption in terms of South African Law is regulated by the Child Care Act. In terms of section 
20 of the Child Care Act an adoption terminates all rights and obligations (ie severs all legal 
ties) that existed between the child and the parents of the child, except in a case where the 
step-parent marries the natural parent of the child. 
The writer interprets this section to mean that parental authority (ie custody and 
guardianship) which was exercised by the biological parent/s of the child before the adoption 
of the child would terminate and the adoptive parents from the date of adoption would have 
parental authority over the adoptive child. 
In terms of section 20(2) of the Child Care Act the child is considered as the legitimate child 
of the adoptive parents, and in terms of section 20(3), the adopted child takes on the 
surname of the adopted parents.  
Before the judgement in the case of Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North,216 only the 
consent of the mother of the child born out of wedlock was required for the adoption of such 
child. The Constitutional Court in the case of Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North217 held 
that section 18(4)(d) of the Child Care Act was unconstitutional, as it discriminated unfairly on 
the grounds of gender and marital status. 
The Constitutional Court held that section 18(4)(d) discriminated against a father of a child 
born out of wedlock on the basis of gender, as consent of the mother of the child is required 
but not that of the father. This section further discriminated against the father of a child born 
out of wedlock on the basis of marital status, as the consent of the father of a legitimate child 
is required when the child is being adopted but not that of a father of a child born out of 
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wedlock.218 Section 18(4)(d) was amended by the legislature to provide that in the case of an 
adoption of a child born out of wedlock, consent of both parents is required for the adoption 
of the child, only if the father of a child born out of wedlock has acknowledged in writing that 
he is the father of the child and has made his identity and whereabouts known.219 
In the case of Haskins v Wildgoose,220 the applicant approached the court for access to his 
minor son born out of wedlock. The access application was initially launched against the 
respondent, the mother of the child. However, after the launch of the proceedings, without 
the knowledge of the applicant, or the respondent’s attorneys, the respondent’s parents 
adopted the minor son. The applicant subsequently amended his papers and joined the new 
adoptive parents as respondents to the pleadings.221  
In terms of section 20(1) of the Child Care Act, an order for adoption severs all legal ties 
which the biological parents have with the biological child. Hefer J in Haskins v Wildgoose222 
considered whether such severing prevented the court as the upper guardian of the child 
from granting the biological father access to his biological son who had been adopted.  
In short, Hefer J held that that the rights and obligations which were severed in terms of 
section 20(1) of the Child Care Act did not include access between a biological child and the 
biological father. The high court is the upper guardian of a minor child and has the power to 
determine whether access by the father to his child was in the child’s best interests. If access 
is in the child’s interests, the court is entitled to make the appropriate order. Therefore, the 
best interests of the child is paramount and if access is in the best interests of the child, then 
access will be granted.223 
Hefer J then considered the best interests criteria set out in B v S.224 Regarding the degree of 
commitment which the father has shown to the child, the court held that the father had 
always taken an interest in the child and that he would continue to show an interest in the 
child if he had the chance to do so. Regarding the degree of attachment which the father and 
the child have between them, the court held that it was clear that there was no degree of 
attachment, as the mother of the child did everything in her power to ensure that there was 
no bond. The court further held that the mother’s consent to the adoption of the child and the 
actual adoption of the child by the mother’s parents was a “ploy designed to defeat the 
father’s claim to access” and the desire of the mother and the “adoptive parents to stifle his 
attempts to see the child smacked of self-interest”.225 With regard to the reasons for the 
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father applying for access to the child, the court stated that the father had a genuine interest 
in his son.226 The court granted phased in access. 
In the case of V v H,227 Liebenberg J did not grant the applicant access to his biological child. 
The facts of the case are as follows: the applicant was the father of a minor daughter. The 
respondent was the mother of the minor daughter. The minor child was born out of wedlock. 
The respondent married the second respondent and two children were born out of this 
marriage. The second respondent legally adopted the minor daughter. The minor daughter 
was not aware that she was adopted nor was she aware that the second respondent was not 
her biological father. The applicant launched proceedings when the minor daughter was 6 
years old. The applicant had exercised his last access when the minor daughter was about 8 
months old. 
Liebenberg J took into account a number of considerations of what would be in the best 
interests of the minor daughter. Liebenberg J held that the applicant had a strong desire to 
build a relationship with his minor daughter and that he had a genuine desire to give the child 
love and affection. However, the court stated that the applicant last had access to the minor 
child when the child was 8 months old and there was no existing bond between the applicant 
and the minor daughter. Further, the minor daughter only acknowledged the second 
respondent as her father. The court further heard evidence that the minor daughter was 
fragile and very insecure and would be traumatised if she determined at this young age that 
the applicant was her biological father.228 The court held that the applicant’s access to his 
minor daughter was not in the best interest of the child. 
3.5 Bringing a common law access application based on the facts of the case study 
In the writer’s opinion, the applicant in the case study would have been unsuccessful if an 
application for access to BD was brought under the common law.  
The applicant’s guardianship application would have failed outright, as there is no clear 
indication why the court should grant the applicant guardianship of BD and there is no 
reasons given on why the court should water down the respondent’s guardianship of BD. The 
courts would not have been persuaded under any circumstance, especially in terms of the 
facts under the case study. 
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Even though in B v S229 Howie J clearly stated that there is no onus of proof in the sense of 
an evidentiary burden or risk of non-persuasion with regard to a father bringing an access 
application for the first time, in practice the evidentiary burden is greater on the father to 
show that it is in the best interests of the child to have access over and above the mother’s 
burden to show that it is not in the best interests of the child that the father have access to 
his child. 
It is clear from the case study that the respondent has a strong relationship with BD. She 
appreciates, understands and loves BD. She understands BD’s psychological make-up and 
knows whether he will be able to cope with the applicant’s access. For the respondent, it is 
simple and easy to show the court that the applicant’s access to BD will not be in BD’s best 
interests. She will produce to the court evidence to show her rocky relationship with the 
applicant, and that by law the applicant was to pay maintenance but does not, indicating that 
the applicant doesn’t care about BD’s financial needs and welfare. The respondent will show 
how her husband took over the applicant’s obligations in terms of BD. She will reveal to the 
court the applicant’s violent behaviour directed towards herself and the respondent’s 
husband. She will further indicate that even though the violent behaviour has never crossed 
over to BD, there is a strong possibility that it might when the applicant has access to BD. 
The respondent will show that BD does not know the applicant, nor is she aware of the 
applicant’s existence. She will show that he is a happy child and happy with his 
surroundings. The respondent will show that the applicant has nothing to offer BD except that 
the applicant is BD’s biological father and that there is no other link. The respondent will 
show that the applicant consumes alcohol excessively. The respondent will show that the 
applicant has not seen BD since he was two-and-a-half years old and there is no bond 
between the applicant and BD. The respondent will attempt to prove that the applicant is not 
in BD’s best interests.  
The applicant does not know what BD likes or dislikes nor does he understand the 
psychological make-up BD. The applicant wants and needs access to BD so that he can 
form a relationship with BD, so that he can get to know BD, so that he can understand BD’s 
psychological make-up. The applicant wants to love BD and wants BD to know and 
recognise that he is BD’s father. This can be stated in words in an affidavit and presented to 
the high court. However, it will be very difficult to prove. The applicant admitted to the rocky 
relationship with the respondent. The applicant admitted to the altercations between himself, 
the respondent and the respondent’s husband. The applicant will explain that such 
altercations were due to the respondent’s rejection of him and his anger directed towards the 
respondent’s husband. The applicant will deny that he is violent and that he will ever act in a 
violent way towards or in front of BD. The applicant will show that maintenance was paid and 
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that the respondent rejected maintenance payments and such payments were placed into a 
trust account. The applicant will show that the reason for BD not bonding with him was the 
result of the respondent’s determination not to allow the applicant access to BD. The 
applicant will insist and will show as far as possible that such access will be in the BD’s best 
interests. 
The applicant and the respondent will inform the high court that the respondent’s husband 
had adopted BD and that such adoption was vigorously opposed by the applicant. 
The high court will consider the best interest test set out in B v S,230 being: the degree of 
commitment which the father has shown to the child, the degree of attachment which the 
father and the child have between them, and the reasons for the father applying for custody.  
With regard to the first query, the court will point out that the applicant is a Zimbabwean 
citizen and that the applicant has shown a commitment towards BD throughout the high court 
and adoption proceedings, as he has been present at every single court hearing. However, 
the court will then consider why the applicant waited a 3-year-period before applying for 
access to BD. The court will further consider whether the applicant will be able to access BD 
on a regular basis, as the applicant does not live in South Africa. 
With regard to the second query, the court will determine that the applicant and BD did have 
some degree of attachment and bond but that this bond was terminated when BD was 2-and-
a-half years old. BD is 7 years old in 2006. The court will further look at the respondent’s 
sheer determination not to let the applicant have such a bond. At this stage, the court will 
determine that the applicant has no bond or attachment to the child. The court will then 
consider BD’s psychological make-up and whether BD will be able to handle such access. 
The court will consider the case of V v H231 and Haskins v Wildgoose.232 
With regard to the third query, the court will recognise that the applicant desires to build a 
relationship with BD. However, the court will consider the history of the matter and will 
determine whether such access will be in BD’s best interests.  
It is in the writer’s opinion that the applicant will be unsuccessful. 
4. THE NATURAL FATHERS OF CHILDREN BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK ACT 86 of 
1997 
4.1 An access application brought in terms of the Natural Fathers of Children Born out 
of Wedlock Act  
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Due to the increase in litigation in the late 1980’s and 1990’s regarding a father’s access to 
his child born out of wedlock, the South African legislature adopted the approach taken in the 
case of B v S233 and rejected the approach taken in the case of Van Erk v Holmer.234 235 On 4 
September 1998, the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act commenced.  
In the absence of an application to the high court, in terms of section 2(1) of the Natural 
Fathers Born out of Wedlock Act by the father of a child born out of wedlock, the mother of 
the child remains the sole guardian and custodian of the child.236 Section 2(1) sets out that 
the natural father born out of wedlock has the locus standi to apply for access, custody, and 
guardianship of his minor child.237 
In terms of section 2(2) of the Natural Fathers Born out of Wedlock Act, the court will only 
grant such application if it is in the best interests of the child.238 This conforms with section 
28(2) of the Constitution, which provides that the best interests of the child are of paramount 
importance in every matter concerning the child. 
Further, in terms of section 2(2) of the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act, 
an application in terms of section 2(1) will not be granted unless the family advocate has held 
an inquiry and has produced a report with recommendations. In terms of section 3(1), the 
family advocate is required to institute such an inquiry if either the court or any party to the 
proceedings requests it. The family advocate will only institute an inquiry as set out in section 
3(1), if a party to the proceedings completes an Annexure B in terms of Regulation 3 of the 
regulations in terms of section 5 of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987 
(“Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Regulations”). However, it must be noted that this is 
the practice followed by the family advocate’s office,239 and the procedure to be followed is 
not set out in Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Regulations or in the Mediation in certain 
Divorce Matters Act. 
In considering the application in terms of section 2(1), the court must take into consideration 
a list of factors set out in section 2(5), which are: 
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? the relationship between the applicant and the natural mother and in particular, 
whether either party has a history of violence against or abusing each other or the 
child 
? the relationship of the child with the applicant and the natural mother or either of them 
or with proposed adoptive parents (if any) or any other person 
? the effect that separating the child from the applicant or the natural mother or 
proposed adoptive parents or any other person is likely to have on the child 
? the attitude of the child in relation to granting of the application 
? the degree of commitment that the applicant has shown towards the child and in 
particular the extent to which the applicant contributed to the lying-in expenses 
incurred by the natural mother in connection with the birth of the child from his or her 
birth to the date on which an order (if any) in respect of payment of maintenance by 
the applicant for the child has been made the extent to which the applicant complies 
with such order 
? whether the child was born of a customary union concluded according to indigenous 
law or custom or a marriage concluded under the system of any religious law, and  
? any other fact that in the opinion of the court should be taken into account. 
In the case T v M,240 Scott JA stated: 
“While at common law the father of an illegitimate child, unlike the father of a legitimate child, 
has no right of access, the difference between the respective positions of the two fathers is not 
one of real substance in practice since in our modern law whether or not access to a minor child 
is granted to its non-custodian father is dependant not upon the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the 
child but in each case wholly upon the child’s welfare which is the central and constant 
consideration. Accordingly, and to the extent that one may choose to speak in terms of an 
inherent right or entitlement, it is the right or entitlement of the child to have access, or to be 
spared access, that determines whether contact with the non-custodian parent will be granted”. 
In terms of section 2(5)(g) of the Natural Fathers of Children’s Born out of Wedlock Act, the 
court may take into account any other fact which in the opinion of the court should be taken 
into account.  
The courts have attempted to broaden the factors of the best interests of the child:  
In the case of Mchiza v Lugalo & Others,241 Nhlangulela AJ held, inter alia, that the best 
interests of the children would be served by giving due weight to the children’s expressed 
preferences. The learned judge went on to say  
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“I have no doubt in my mind that these children are sufficiently intelligent to appreciate the 
nature and consequences of their preferences. To ignore them would surely contradict their 
interests.”242 
The case of Wicks v Fisher243 was decided before the commencement of the Natural Fathers 
of Children Born out of Wedlock Act. However, Pillay J was mindful of the Natural Fathers of 
Children Born out of Wedlock Act and placed emphasis on the trend to move away from 
considering the custodian parent’s rights as more important than those of the natural father, 
and focused on section 28(2) of the Constitution.  
Pillay AJ stated that in custody or access applications, the only factor of interest is the best 
interests of the child. The court considered a number of factors. One such factor was the 
bond which has been created between father and son. The learned judge went on to state 
that: 
“it is worth mentioning at this stage that apart from other factors, it is also in Calvin's interests to 
have access to his father unless there are very cogent reasons why this should not be so. Once 
a material bond has been established, which I believe to be so in the present case, it is in the 
interests of the child that it be maintained.” 244 
The court considered other factors such the child’s environment in South Africa and the 
child’s relationship with different members of the family. The Court also considered that it 
would be in the best interests of the child that the child be represented by a curator ad 
litem.245 This case246 clearly sets out that the courts are moving away from the rigid approach 
taken in the case of B v S.247 
4.2 Bringing an access application under the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of 
Wedlock Act, based on the facts of case study 
It is clear from the case study that the adoption application of BD was granted in favour of the 
respondent’s husband. If the applicant was able to raise the security determined by the 
registrar, the applicant would have continued with the application for access in terms of 
section 2(1) of the Natural Fathers of the Children Born out of Wedlock Act. 
It seems that the high court would have taken a more lenient approach than the approach 
taken under the common law. This is merely an opinion of the writer and is adduced from the 
approach taken in recent case law.  
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The court would not necessarily take into account the family advocate’s report and 
recommendations, and has a discretion whether or not to consider the family advocate’s 
report.  
As the family advocate’s report is not in the respondent’s favour, the respondent will attempt 
to discredit the family advocate’s report by arguing that an analysis of the respondent, the 
respondent’s husband and BD over a period of two hours on a single day could not have 
allowed the family advocate to come to the conclusion that it did. They will request the court 
to call the family advocate and the family counsellor and will argue that the family advocate’s 
report and recommendations should not be taken into account. It must further be noted that 
only the family advocate and the family counsellor interviewed all the parties to the 
proceedings and this would be in favour of the applicant. 
The high court would have considered in terms of section 2(5) of the Natural Fathers Born 
out of Wedlock Act the factors of what would be in the best interests of BD.  
In terms of section 2(5)(a) of the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act the 
court would have considered  
“the relationship between the applicant and the natural mother and in particular, whether either 
party has a history of violence against or abusing each other or the child”. 
The stance taken by the respondent in this application was the history of the altercations 
between the respondent, the respondent’s husband and the applicant. The respondent would 
then focus on the continued history of violence that the applicant has shown towards people 
around him and the community. This is clearly shown in the respondent’s replying affidavit 
and affidavit in terms of the counter-application. The applicant will admit to the altercations 
but the applicant will produce evidence that he believed that the respondent’s husband was 
the cause of his relationship breakdown with the respondent and that before the break-up 
between the applicant and the respondent the relationship was happy. The respondent will 
argue that this was not the case. 
In terms of section 2(5)(b) of the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act the 
court would have considered “the relationship of the child with the applicant and the natural 
mother”. It would be shown by the applicant that before the respondent left for South Africa, 
he had a close relationship with BD, that they had a close father-and-son relationship. The 
applicant will concede that the relationship with the respondent was troubled but only after 
the break-up with the respondent. The applicant would have argued that the applicant’s 
relationship with BD would have flourished if the respondent hadn’t remove BD from 
Zimbabwe and that he would have had a close father-and-son bond to this day. The 
applicant would have argued that the respondent allowed access before they left for South 
Africa and that he should be allowed to continue with such access. 
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The respondent would have argued that the applicant and BD did not have a close 
relationship and that the applicant did not have BD’s interests at heart. The respondent 
would have produced evidence that the applicant abused alcohol in the presence of BD and 
generally didn’t care about BD’s welfare. It is further possible that the respondent would have 
subpoenaed Dr B to appear in court to give evidence in this regard.  
The applicant would have further argued that he has shown an extreme degree of 
commitment towards BD. The applicant will show that he contributed to the lying-in expenses 
in connection with the birth of the BD and that he continued to pay maintenance with regard 
to BD into a trust account.  
The respondent will argue that she had to commence working after the birth of BD so as to 
provide adequately for BD. The respondent will further argue that applicant’s maintenance 
payments where erratic and not the amounts that they agreed to. The respondent would 
have further argued that the maintenance paid per month into the trust account in Zimbabwe 
by the applicant is an insignificant amount and that the respondent’s husband took over the 
applicant’s financial obligations with regard to BD. 
The respondent would have further argued that BD is only 7 years old and is age 
appropriate. He has not been informed that he is adopted nor is he aware that the 
respondent’s husband is not his father. The respondent would have argued that it would not 
be in BD’s best interests to inform him of the applicant existence.  
Even though the courts have taken a more lenient approach, the writer believes that the 
applicant’s access application would have been unsuccessful, as the high court would have 
held that the applicant’s access to BD would not be in BD’s best interests. 
5. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, THE AFRICAN 
CHARTER AND SECTION 28(1)(b) OF THE CONSTITUTION  
5.1 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
South Africa undertook to comply with the obligations and directives set out by international 
treaties and to change its domestic laws to comply with these international treaties. An 
international treaty of significant importance is the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, 1989 (“the Convention”). The Convention was ratified by the South African 
government on 16 June 1995.248 
In 1989, the Convention changed the way the international community viewed children and 
the rights of children. Before the advent of Convention, children were not viewed as the 
bearers of rights. They were viewed as a group that required special protection249 and were 
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249  Sloth Nielson 1995 SAJHR 402. 
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regarded as “mere property” 250 of their parents. The Convention gave children rights and 
entitlements which children could claim. Children were regarded as the bearers of such 
rights.251 In the international community there was a movement away from the mere moral 
obligations of each international state to look after and protect children in their own 
communities and internationally, to international states recognising, acknowledging, pledging 
that they will fully protect children, respect and uphold the rights and liberties of children.252 
The Convention focuses on the main aspect that the child has the right to have a family 
life.253 Article 1 of the Convention clearly stipulates that a child is a person under the age of 
18 years.254 This criterion applies to all children within the jurisdiction of the state.255 This 
means that the Convention applies to all children within the member state’s border’s, 
regardless of whether the child has citizenship/permanent residence or not.256 The best 
interests’ criterion is a primary consideration when determining all actions pertaining to 
children.257 
Article 7(1) stipulates that every child has “the right to know and to be cared for by his 
parents” and in terms of article 7(2), state parties shall ensure that the right in terms of article 
7(1) is implemented. Article 9(1) specifies that a child is not to be separated from its parents, 
unless it is in the child’s best interests.258 
In terms of article 4 of the Convention, all parties which have signed and ratified the 
Convention must draft and implement appropriate domestic legislation which recognises the 
rights of children set out in the Convention.259 The Convention has established an 
international monitoring committee in which it ensures that states which have ratified the 
Convention comply with their obligations.260 
South Africa has ratified the Convention and has undertaken to conform to the obligations 
and responsibilities as set out in the Convention in articles 4 and 7(2). South Africa has 
undertaken to draft and implement legislation to conform to these new rights and obligations.  
5.2 The African Charter on the Rights and the Welfare of the Child261  
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (“the Charter”) came into force on 
29 November 1999 and the South Africa government ratified the Charter on 7 January 2000. 
This Charter has a significant effect on South Africa, as it focuses on children’s rights in 
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Africa. The Charter’s foundation stems from the Convention262 and focuses on the family unit 
as the centre in which children are raised.263 Article 18 points out that the “role of the family 
[is] the basis of society and a natural unit within which children are reared”. 264 Article 19(1) of 
the Charter states that:  
“every child shall be entitled to the enjoyment of parental care and protection and shall, 
whenever possible, have the right to reside with his parents…… [unless] such separation is in 
the best interest of the child”.  
Article 19(2) clearly stipulates that “every child who is separated from one or both parents 
shall have the right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a 
regular basis”. The Charter regards the best interests of the child as the primary criterion 
when dealing with actions pertaining to the child.265  
The Charter further places a responsibility on the South African government to ensure that its 
domestic legislation conforms to the obligations set out in the Charter.266  
5.3 The Rights of the Child as set out in section 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and enacted new domestic legislation 
has changed the common-law view. In terms of section 28 of the Constitution, children are 
now seen as the bearers of rights and the state, as well as the South African public must 
take the best interests of the child into consideration in every matter dealing with the child.267 
It is clear that the Convention and the Charter have had a significant influence on wording of 
section 28 of the Constitution.  
Section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution guarantees that 
“every child has the right to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when 
removed from the family environment”.  
The Constitution guarantees that every child has the right to be looked after or cared for by 
the child’s parents or family. This echoes the concept in the Convention which clearly 
stipulates that the child has a right to know and to be cared for by its parents268 and not to be 
separated from its parents, unless it is in the child’s best interests.269 It is clear from section 
28(1)(b) of the Constitution that the focus is on the responsibilities which parents have 
towards their children and not on parental authority. There is a shift in reasoning from 
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parental authority to parental rights and responsibilities.270 This right becomes the right of the 
child.271 
It has been stated that the right to parental care includes the right to be cared for by both 
parents.272 In South African common law, the fathers of children who are not married or who 
are married according to Muslim rights or customary rights are not considered to have a right 
to care for their children or to have access to them.273 They only have a duty of support.274 
Due to the advent of the Constitution and the ratification of the Convention and the Charter, 
domestic legislation has intervened and has changed the common law. The Children’s Act 
recognises, in terms of section 21, that biological fathers of illegitimate children will be given 
automatic family rights and responsibilities if they comply with certain criteria.275 It must be 
noted, however, that the Children’s Act is not yet in force and the Natural Fathers of Children 
Born out of Wedlock Act, which is in place, attempts to normalise the relationship between 
the illegitimate child and the biological father. 
Even though the Constitution protects the right to parental care in section 28(1)(b) and 
guarantees that the child’s best interests are taken into account when determining a matter 
concerning the child, the law may still be misinterpreted. This is clearly shown in the 
interpretation by Van Dijkhorst J in the case of Jooste v Botha.276 This case was the first case 
of its kind in South Africa where the child was using the Constitution to enforce his rights. 
The facts of the case are as follows: the plaintiff is an 11-year-old boy born out of wedlock 
who has sued the defendant, his father, based on an action for damages suffered due to the 
defendant not rendering him any attention, love and interest. The matter came before the 
court as the defendant took an exception to the plaintiff’s summons stating that the plaintiff 
failed to disclose a cause of action in his pleadings. The plaintiff based his argument on 
section 28(1)(b)277 and 28(2)278 of the Constitution. Van Dijkhorst J focused on the relevant 
constitutional provisions and concluded that neither our common law nor statutes recognise 
the right of a child to be loved, cherished and attended to by a parent. A bond of love is not a 
legal bond. The court upheld the exception. 
Van Dijkhorst J based his decision on a number of reasons. The reasoning of importance to 
this dissertation is that the non-custodian parent of a child born in wedlock and the natural 
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father of a child born out of wedlock who does not have custody, falls outside the scope of 
section 28(1)(b).279  
A number of authors280 have disagreed with this interpretation. It is acknowledged in terms of 
our common law that access is an incidence of parental authority. A father of a child born out 
of wedlock does not have such parental authority but our legislation through the Natural 
Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act gives recognition that such fathers could apply 
for custody, guardianship and access to their minor children. The high court is the upper 
guardian of the child and will decide whether it is in the best interests of the child that the 
father shall have access or custody or guardianship over child.281 Once the court grants the 
father access to the child, the father becomes responsible for the child during such access 
and this includes care. The child has the right to be cared for by both parents and to know 
both parents. This right belongs to the child and not to the parents of the child. This right is 
enshrined in the Convention, as well as Charter. As indicated above, the Constitution has 
heavily relied on the wording in both international treaties.  
It is true to say, as Van Zyl and Bekker282 have pointed out, that once an inquiry in terms of 
access or custody or guardianship has been instituted, the family advocate advises the 
parties from the onset that both parties’ rights in terms of access, custody and guardianship 
to their minor children, whether the child is born in or out of wedlock, is guaranteed. Jooste v 
Botha283 articulates the clear message that this right is not guaranteed.  
However, it must be noted that in the case of Heystek v Heystek,284 the learned judge stated 
that a child’s right to parental care in terms of section 28(1)(b) is not confined to the child’s 
natural parents but also includes or extends to other types of parents such as step-parents, 
adoptive parents and foster parents. Authors such as Cronje & Heaton285 clearly stipulate 
that this would further include non-custodian parents and this would be in line with the 
subsequent constitutional court decision of Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom.286 Foxcroft J in the case of Allsop v McCann287 adopted this view that parental is 
not restricted to custodian parents and that children have a right to parental care from non 
custodian parents. 
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6. THE CHILDREN’S ACT 38 of 2005 
6.1 Introduction 
The Children’s Act was published on 19 June 2006 under Government Gazette No 28944 
and will only came into effect on a date fixed by the President of the Republic of South Africa 
by proclamation in the Government Gazette.288 The Children’s Act brings about a new era in 
South African parent and child law. This Act looks at South African parent and child law from 
a different perspective; no longer is the focus on parental authority and the rights of the 
parents over the child but on children’s rights. The children are the bearers of these rights. 
The Children’s Act attempts to comply with the directives set out in the Convention and the 
Charter, as well as the rights enshrined in section 28 of the Constitution. 
6.2 Best interests of the child 
The Children’s Act clearly provides that the best interests of the child are of paramount 
importance and must be applied and taken into account when dealing with all matters 
concerning the care, protection and the wellbeing of the child.289 Section 7(1) of the 
Children’s Act seems to set out an exhaustive list of what should be taken into account when 
considering what would be in the best interest of the child. Even though this list is exhaustive, 
it is extremely comprehensive.290 
                                                 
288  S 315 of the Children’s Act. 
289  S 9 of the Children’s Act. 
290  S 7(1) of the Children’s Act: Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child 
standard to be applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely –  
the nature of the personal relationship between – 
the child and the parents, or any specific parent; and 
the child and any other care giver or person relevant in those circumstances; 
the attitude of the parents, or any other specific parent, towards - 
the child; and 
the exercise of parental responsibility and rights in respect of the child; 
the capacity of the parents, or any other specific parent, or of any other caregiver or person, to provide for the 
needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs; 
the likely effect on the child of any change in the child’s circumstances, including the likely effect on the child of 
any separation from - 
both or either of the parents; or  
any brother or sister or any other child, or any other care giver or person with whom the child has been living; 
the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with the parents, or any specific parent, and whether 
that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and direct 
contact with the parents, or specific parent, on a regular basis; 
the need for the child 
to remain in the care of his or her parent, family and extended family; and 
to maintain a connection with his or her family, extended family, culture or tradition; 
the child’s 
age, maturity and stage of development; 
gender; 
background; 
and any other relevant characteristics of the child; 
the child’s physical and emotional security and his or her intellectual emotional, social and cultural development; 
any disability that the child may have; 
any chronic illness from which the child might suffer 
the need for the child to be brought up within a stable family environment and where this is not possible a caring 
family environment; 
the need to be protect the child from any physical or psychological harm that may be caused by –  
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6.3 Parental rights and responsibilities 
The Children’s Act has moved away from the concept of parental authority to the concept of 
parental rights and responsibilities.291 Case law already has started recognising the 
importance of children’s rights and interests over that of their parents and has linked this to 
the duties and responsibilities which parents have towards their children.292 The South 
African Law Commission293 indicates that South Africa is a signatory to the Convention and 
has in terms of article 4 of the Convention undertaken to draft national legislation which will 
promote the rights of the child, and is obliged to shift away from the concept of parental 
authority to parental rights and responsibilities.294  
Parental responsibility is defined in section 18 of the Children’s Act as the responsibility to 
care for the child,295 to maintain contact with the child,296 to act as guardian of the child,297 
and to contribute to the maintenance of the child.298 The Children’s Act further sets out that a 
person may have full or specific parental responsibilities and rights.299 Full parental 
responsibilities and rights means that a person may be entitled to all the rights set out in 
section 18 of the Children’s Act. Specific parental responsibilities and rights mean that a 
person may only have a specific right in terms of section 18 of the Children’s Act, for 
example, the right only to act as guardian of the child.  
In terms of section 1(2) of the Children’s Act the word “access” is replaced with the word 
“contact” and the word “custody” is replaced with the word “care”.  
Contact is further defined in the Children’s Act in Section 1(1) as: 
“in relation to a child, means maintaining a personal relationship with the child; and if the child 
lives with somebody else: communication on a regular basis with the child in person which 
includes visiting the child or being visited by the child; or communicating on a regular basis with 
                                                                                                                                                        
subjecting the child to maltreatment, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or degradation or exposing the child to violence 
or exploitation or other harmful behavior; or; 
exposing the child to maltreatment, abuse degradation, ill-treatment, violence harmful behavior towards another 
person; 
any family violence involving the child or a family member of the child; and 
which action or decision would avoid or minimise further legal or administrative proceedings in relation to the 
child. 
291  “Executive Summary: Children’s Bill (B70-2003) Re-Introduced” 
(http://www.pmg.org.za.docs/2004/appendices/040805execsummary.htm visited on 21 June 2006) 1. 
292  South African Law Commission The Review of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 Discussion Paper 103 Project 
110, ch 8 (http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/ci/plr/pdf/salrc_dis/10-dp103-ch8.pdf visited on 29 August 2006) 195 
(“SALC discussion paper”). The SALC sets out an important quote by Foxcroft J in the case of V v V 1998 
(4) SA 169 (C) 176D “There is no doubt that over the last couple of years the emphasis in thinking in 
regard to questions of relationships between parents and their children has shifted from the concept of 
parental power to one of parental responsibility and children’s rights. Children’s rights are no longer 
confined to the common law, but also find expression in s 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, not to mention a wide range of international conventions.” 
293  SALC discussion paper (supra n 292) ch 8. 
294  SALC discussion paper (supra n 292) 197. 
295  S 18(2)(a) of the Children’s Act. 
296  S 18(2)(b) of the Children’s Act . 
297  S 18(2)(c) of the Children’s Act. 
298  S 18(2)(d) of the Children’s Act. 
299  S 18(1) of the Children’s Act. 
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the child in any other manner including through the post or by the telephone or any other form of 
electronic communications”. 
A child is defined as any person under the age of 18. 
6.4 Section 21: Unmarried fathers  
6.4.1 Introduction 
In terms of section 19 of the Children’s Act, it is clear that the drafters have continued with 
the common-law privileges and rights that the biological mother has over their minor child.300 
It is further clear that the drafters have further attempted to move away from the harsh 
wording of the common law and avoided the words “illegitimate child” or “child born out of 
wedlock”.301 The perspective is different and the focus is now on the parents, whether they 
are married or not. 
In terms of section 20 of the Children’s Act, the common-law privileges and rights associated 
with regard to a married father over his child continues. A married father acquires full 
parental rights and responsibilities over his child if he was married302 to the mother of the 
child303 or was married to the mother of the child at the time of conception304 or birth305 or 
between conception and birth.306 
In terms of section 21, the drafters have a taken a bold and exciting step. The SALC 
discussion paper has shown that even though commonwealth countries have looked at 
whether or not to grant unmarried fathers automatic parental rights and responsibilities, they 
have opted not to and have chosen other options for unmarried fathers to acquire rights and 
responsibilities in respect of their children.307  
                                                 
300  In terms of the Children’s Status Act s 3(1), if a minor is unmarried and gives birth to a child, the 
guardianship of the minor’s child vests in her guardian. Once she attains the age of majority (which is 21 
years of age under the Children’s Status Act) she becomes the child’s guardian (Van Heerden et al 
Boberg’s Law of Persons and Family 394). In terms of the Children’s Act s 19(2)(a) & (b), if the mother who 
is unmarried is a minor and the father of the child does not have guardianship, guardianship of the child 
vests in the guardian of the minor mother. 
301  SALC discussion paper (supra n 292) 238. 
302  In terms of s 1 of the Children’s Act, marriage is defined as a marriage recognised in terms of South 
African Law or customary Law, or concluded in accordance with a system of religious law subject to 
specific procedures. The Children’s Act now specifically recognises Muslim marriages. Fathers of children 
born from these marriages will be regarded as married fathers in terms of s 20 of the Children’s Act. The 
Children’s Act has taken away the harsh realities that such fathers face when approaching the high court 
for access, guardianship and custody of their children. Now they will automatically have such parental 
rights and responsibilities over the child unless terminated in terms of s 28 of the Children’s Act.  
303  S 20(a) of the Children’s Act.  
304  S 20(b)(i) of the Children’s Act. 
305  S 20(b)(ii) of the Children’s Act. 
306  S 20(b)(iii) of the Children’s Act. 
307  In England, the approach taken is that unmarried mothers and fathers can conclude an agreement which is 
properly registered and made an order. If no agreement is concluded then the unmarried father must 
approach the court and acquire such parental rights and responsibilities. The SALC discussion paper has 
further set out that English law has not gone without criticism and there is a proposal to change the current 
English law so that it allows unmarried fathers automatic parental rights and responsibilities “if the 
unmarried father signs the application to register the child’s birth and is named as a parent on the birth 
certificate”.  
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In England,308 Scotland309 and Kenya,310 the approach taken is that unmarried mothers and 
fathers must conclude an agreement which is properly registered and made an order, for the 
fathers of such children to acquire specific or full parental rights and responsibilities. If no 
agreement is concluded, the unmarried father must approach the court and acquire such 
parental rights and responsibilities  
The SALC discussion paper has further set out that English law has not gone without 
criticism and there is a proposal to change the current English law so that it allows unmarried 
fathers automatic parental rights and responsibilities only “if the unmarried father signs the 
application to register the child’s birth and is named as a parent on the birth certificate.”311 
In Australian law, marital status does not affect parental rights and responsibilities which the 
parties have towards their child. This is similar to a stance taken in a number of African 
countries such as Ghana.312 
The drafters of the Children’s Act have moved away from the stance taken in B v S313 and 
have recognised the plight of many unmarried fathers and their children. Children have a 
right to know their fathers and have a right to form a relationship with them. As Van Zyl in 
Van Erk v Holmer314 stated:  
“I believe the time has indeed arrived for the recognition by our Courts of an inherent right of 
access by a natural father to his illegitimate child.” That such right should be recognized is 
amply justified by the precepts of justice, equity and reasonableness and by the demands of 
public policy. It should be removed only if the access should be shown to be contrary to the best 
interest of the child”.315 
The Children’s Act has moved one step further. It has recognised not only that unmarried 
fathers should have inherent right of contact, but also that they should have an in inherent 
right of guardianship and care. 
6.4.2 Section 21(1): Inherent right of contact, care and guardianship 
An unmarried biological father has automatic parental rights and responsibilities in respect of 
his child if he complies with certain criteria.  
6.4.3 Analysis of section 21(1)(a) 
                                                 
308  With regard to English law see SALC discussion paper (supra n 292) 250-251. 
309  With regard to Scottish law see SALC discussion paper (supra n 292) 259. 
310  With regard to Kenyan Law see SALC discussion paper (supra n 292) 246-247. 
311  SALC discussion paper (supra n 292) 254. 
312  In terms of the Ghanaian family law “parental duty and responsibility applies to all parents regardless of 
their marital status and of whether or not they are living together” (SALC discussion paper (supra n 292) 
246). 
313  B v S 1995 (3) SA 571 (A). 
314  Van Erk v Holmer 1992 (2) SA 636 (W). 
315  Van Erk v Holmer 1992 (2) SA 636 (W)  649 I–J. 
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If the unmarried father at the time of the birth of the child was living in a life-partnership with 
the mother of the child, he will have an inherent right of contact, care and guardianship. Life-
partnership means that the parties where living in a de facto husband and wife relationship 
and chose not to get married. 
6.4.4 Analysis of section 21(1)(b) 
If an unmarried father, whether he was living with the mother of the child or not, consents to 
be identified as the father of the child or applies for an amendment to be effected on the birth 
certificate that the father is registered as the biological father of the child terms of the Births 
and Deaths Registration Act or pays damages in terms of customary law, contributes or has 
attempted to contribute in good faith to the upbringing of the child within a reasonable period, 
and has paid or attempted to pay maintenance in relation to the upbringing of the child, the 
father of the child will have automatic parental rights and responsibilities. 
6.4.5 Discussion of section 21(2) 
Section 21(2) confirms the common-law duty of support that parents of minor children, 
whether born in or out of wedlock, has towards their minor children. The wording of this 
section is clear: “this section does not affect the duty of the father to contribute towards the 
maintenance of the child”. 
6.4.6 Analysis of section 21(3)(a): The family advocate and mediation 
6.4.6.1 Introduction 
In terms of section 21(3)(a),316 if there is a dispute by the mother of the child regarding the 
fulfilment of the criteria set out in section 21(1)(a) or (b) by the father of the child, the matter 
must be referred for mediation. It must be noted from the onset that mediation in family law is 
not a recognised concept in South African Law. The South African public is slowly moving 
towards using mediation centres. However, the writer has noted that even though the parties 
resort to mediation, the matter ends up being adjudicated. In family-law matters, especially 
surrounding children, there is a lot of acrimony between the parties. 
Family law, especially with regard to unmarried fathers attempting to obtain contact, care and 
guardianship, is complex by nature. The legal process of an unmarried father attempting to 
move through our courts in litigation is no easy task. The amount of time and money a litigant 
spends in obtaining guardianship, care and contact is astronomical. The emotional pressure 
is overwhelming. Due to the adversarial nature of our court procedures, many litigants are 
unhappy with the outcome of their matters, and often feel that their legal practitioners could 
                                                 
316  S 21(3)(a) of the Children’s Act states that “if there is a dispute between the biological father referred to in 
subsection (1) and the biological mother with regard to the fulfillment by that father of the conditions set out 
in subsection (1)(a) or (b), the matter must be referred for mediation to a family advocate, social worker, 
social services professional or other suitably qualified person”. 
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have dealt with their matters differently. In all opposed motions, especially with regard to 
children, there is never a win-win situation. 317  
6.4.6.2 Adjudication 
Due to many circumstances and consequences many people have children without getting 
married. These parties either live together as if they were married318 or they will continue with 
their separate lives, as if there was no child holding them together. Some parties will 
experience a complete decline in their relationship and with such decline will come the 
acrimony associated with the termination of the relationship. Unmarried fathers will be 
declined contact to their children based on a number of circumstances when the mother 
believes that no contact or care from the unmarried would be in the child’s best interests.  
Termination of such relationships in South African law requires no formal and rigid approach. 
There are usually no assets to divide and if they are it is usually based on a cohabitation 
agreement or lien over the said property.  
Matters which become of great concern to mothers of such children are maintenance 
payments by the father of the child and the father’s access to his child. The mother of the 
child will do anything to protect the child and will entrench a minimum standard of contact 
that the unmarried father will have to his child. The party that loses in this type of situation is 
the child.  
The father will launch an access application for access to his child. The adjudication will 
increase the acrimony between the parties.319 Once acrimony is present, the parties usually 
cannot compromise in any way without the intervention of their legal practitioners. The legal 
practitioners will do what is necessary to attempt to settle the matter. However, the costs 
associated with settlement and the litigation increase dramatically. The children are used as 
pawns, the parties fight over custody, over access, over maintenance. It seems never-
ending. However, if the matter proceeds to court, the court will decide the fate of the parties. 
Most parties cannot afford to take their matters to trial.320 This places most parties at a 
disadvantage, as they have to settle on an agreement that is not truly beneficial for the 
children. 
It is a reality that the quality of family law adjudication matters in our high courts is shocking, 
the family Advocate’s office is overworked and underpaid. Due to the amount of pressure 
placed on our courts, the acrimony and costs associated with contested family law 
adjudication is shocking.  
                                                 
317  Pretorius Dispute resolution 74. 
318  As in a cohabitation arrangement. 
319  Clark 1993 THRHR 455.  
320  An estimation of the costs for junior counsel (Sandton Bar) for a day at the high court, South Africa 
(Witwatersrand Local Division) (without preparation) amounts to an approximate amount of R9000.00 
exclusive of VAT; for senior counsel (Sandton Bar) the approximate day fee (without preparation) amounts 
to R 15000.00 exclusive of VAT. 
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The Children’s Act has attempted to introduce mediation as a starting point.321  
In the current adversarial system, legal practitioners generally do their best to settle their 
client’s problems for them322 and are compassionate.323 Most legal practitioners are ethical 
and warn their clients of the costs involved. They call round table meetings, attend pre-trial 
conferences, offer settlement and draft settlement agreements. These settlement 
negotiations are on a “without prejudice” basis and cannot be used in a court. Most legal 
practitioners try to decrease the acrimony between the parties. They have the legal duty 
when there are children involved, to consider what is in the best interests of the children. 
Legal practitioners further protect their clients from legal injustices that the other party might 
have performed “without further stimulating further family conflict”.324 Parties to a family law 
matter in the adversarial process will only reach settlement and the acrimony between the 
parties will only decrease, if the parties themselves agree to resolve their disputes through 
their legal practitioner. Many authors325 state that there are concerns relating to family law 
mediation, whilst others326 believe it is the solution to problems associated with the 
adversarial system.327  
If there is a problem associated with maintenance, contact or care surrounding their children, 
parties will automatically approach their attorney or approach the court directly to determine 
what would be the best solution for them. Family Law mediation is not extensively 
practised328 nor is it promoted in South Africa and many individuals do not even consider 
approaching one of the mediation centres329 to settle maintenance, contact or care 
surrounding their children with their partners. 
In terms of section 21(3)(a) of the Children’s Act mediation has been introduced as part of 
our law.330 
Mediation is defined as 
                                                 
321  In terms of s 21(3)(a) of the Children’s Act.  
322  Schäfer 1984 DR 16 19. 
323  Van Zyl Divorce mediation and the best interests of the child 178. 
324  Schäfer 1984 DR 17. 
325  Goldberg 1998 TSAR 748 749; Van Zyl Divorce mediation and the best interests of the child 178. 
326  Cohen 1993 DR 642. 
327  Pretorius Dispute resolution 74. 
328  Pretorius  Dispute resolution 50. 
329  Such as FAAMSA (Family Life) and SAAM (South African Association of Mediators). Also discussed in 
Goldberg 1998 TSAR 748. 
330  The Hoexter report on the structure and function of the courts in South Africa (1983) recommended 
mediation in the proposed family court. The bill that was drafted setting out the Hoexter recommendations 
was rejected. There has been no move in our law from an adversarial position to an inquisitorial position. 
Instead the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act was passed which created the office of the family 
advocate, which looks after the best interests of the children to divorcing parties. The family advocate is not 
a mediator and does not mediate between the parties (Clark 1993 THRHR 455). Also see Cronje & Heaton 
South African Family Law 184. 
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“a process by which the participants, together with the assistance of a neutral person or 
persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider alternatives 
and reach consensual settlement which will accommodate their needs”.331 332  
This means that parties will have to agree to attend the mediation process.333 Once the 
parties have agreed to attend such mediation the parties will have the choice of what they 
would like to discuss. The mediator is a neutral party and will facilitate, without getting 
involved in the process, to help the parties reach a settlement (which is a non-binding 
agreement). Therefore it is clear that the success of mediation is in the willingness of the 
parties to participate in the mediation and cooperate with one another. However, even 
though family mediation seems positive, there are many concerns regarding family 
mediation.  
In terms of section 21(3)(a) of the Children’s Act it is clear that if there is a dispute between 
the biological mother and the biological father with regard to the fulfilment by that father of 
the criteria set out in section 21(2) of the Children’s Act, the matter “must be referred for 
mediation”. This means that in terms of this section, mediation is mandatory. This does not 
conform to the definition of mediation set out above. If the mediation is mandatory, what are 
the consequences if the parties do not attend such mediation? In terms of the Children’s Act 
there does not seem to be any consequences. 
Further, if for example the biological father refers the matter to mediation and the biological 
mother fails to attend the mediation, can the matter be taken directly to high court for 
adjudication or must it be referred back to mediation? The Children’s Act is not clear on what 
the next step would be. If the next step is to set another date for mediation and one of the 
parties do not attend the new mediation date, does this then mean that the matter must be 
sent to the high court or the children’s court for adjudication? Who is entitled to take the 
matter to high court or the children’s court and in terms of what section? Further, will the 
court merely frown upon the parties’ non attendance of the mediation process or is this 
section a loophole? Can the parties bypass the whole mediation process by merely not 
attending the mediation?  
6.4.6.3 Concerns regarding mediation 
Mediator’s qualifications 
There are no formal requirements as to who may act as a mediator.334 There is no 
standardisation of qualifications, nor do the mediators have to belong to a body or 
                                                 
331  Pretorius Dispute resolution 75. 
332  Also see definition set out in Goldberg 1998 TSAR 748.  
333  In other words mediation is not mandatory. 
334  Goldberg 1998 TSAR 748. 
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association which regulates them.335 336 Furthermore, there is no code of ethics or conduct337 
which mediators need to follow.  
Social workers/psychologists are themselves not necessarily versed in the law and this can 
lead to serious consequences when attempting mediation.338 Lawyers are versed in the law 
but are not necessarily compassionate towards the parties in mediation. This can also lead to 
serious consequences when attempting mediation. Parties that attend mediation expect 
competent mediators who are compassionate to their needs but who also understand the 
law.339 It is therefore of great concern that parties attend mediations in which the mediator is 
unqualified to attend to the mediation and the parties have no way of checking the status or 
the competence of the mediator.340 Owing to the low standard of mediators, lack of uniform 
qualifications and a code of conduct, the mediation process in South Africa is brought into 
disrepute.  
It is clear from section 21(3)(a) of the Children’s Act that the mediation must be referred to 
the family advocate, social worker, social service provider or any other suitably qualified 
person. 
In terms of section 1, the family advocate is defined as a family advocate in terms of the 
Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act. The powers and duties of the family advocate are 
set out in section 4(1) of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act, which provides that 
the family advocate shall 
“institute an inquiry to enable him to furnish the court at the trial of such action or the hearing of 
such application with a report and recommendation on any matter concerning the welfare of 
each minor child or dependant child”. 
It has been outlined by Van Zyl that that “mediation” by the family advocate differs from the 
common understanding of mediation, as mediation is not completely voluntarily submitted to 
by both parties, the family advocate actively participates in the decision making, the 
mediation involves the establishment of facts on which the parties agree, the family advocate 
                                                 
335  Goldberg 1996 TSAR 358 360. 
336  Attorneys need a certain standard of qualification. They all belong to a regulatory body that ensure that 
their members are bound by ethics. 
337  Goldberg 1996 TSAR 360. 
338  Ie parties cannot agree to place themselves in a position which is contra bones mores, or where children 
are concerned, the parties cannot agree to something that is against the children’s best interests.  
339  Clark 1993 THRHR 461. 
340  Visser v Visser (unopposed divorce in the Witwatersrand Local Division). The parties attended mediation in 
which the mediator suggested joint physical custody of their two-year-old female child. A parenting plan 
was drawn up in which it was agreed that the female child would reside with the mother for a 3-day period 
and then would reside with the father for a 3-day period. The family advocate queried such agreement 
stating that it was not in the best interests of the child. For the divorce to proceed, the senior advocate 
suggested to call the mediator as a witness, so that the mediator may testify to her qualifications and 
reason for the suggestion of joint physical custody. The mediator however, could not be called as the 
mediator had no qualifications.  
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involves an evaluation of the parenting abilities and the children participate in the mediation 
process.341 
Neither the family advocate nor the family counsellors  (ie social workers) has been trained 
or is equipped to handle actual mediation between parties and to ensure that the parties 
attempt to reach settlement. For the family advocate to comply with section 21(3)(a) of the 
Children’s Act, the family advocate’s office must firstly train their staff so that they will be able 
to handle and manage mediation between parties; secondly, in practice it is clear that the 
family advocate’s office is understaffed. The workload in the family advocate’s office is great, 
and the family advocate is only handling queries under two acts.342 In terms of the Children’s 
Act, the family advocate’s workload will increase tenfold. The involvement of the family 
advocate in the Children’s Act is overwhelmingly too large for the family advocate to 
handle.343  
From the writer’s examination of the Family Advocate’s Office in Johannesburg,344 it is clear 
that resources are not being allocated to the family advocate’s office. There are no 
computers, the offices are dark and dreary. There are 2 photocopy machines. Only one of 
these machines is working. There is a single fax at reception. There are only 5 family 
advocates. In general, not including urgent matters, the turn-around time for the family 
advocate’s offices to book a query is 4 to 6 months from the date the Annexure B has been 
submitted. 
As set out above, the mediation in terms of section 21(3) of the Children’s Act can also be 
referred to a social worker, social services professional or any other suitably qualified person. 
In terms of section 1 of the Children’s Act, a social worker is a person who is registered 
under the Social Services Professions Act 110 of 1978, and a social services professional 
includes a probation officer, development worker, child and youth care worker, youth worker, 
social auxiliary worker and social security workers who are registered under the Social 
Services Act. “Any other suitably qualified person” is not defined. We therefore go back to the 
initial concern: many of the mediators in South Africa are not qualified. They do not have the 
necessary qualifications, nor do they have the necessary training to conduct mediations. 
There is no body that ensures that these mediators conform to a code of conduct 
Confidentiality 
                                                 
341  Van Zyl Divorce mediation and the best interests of the child 375. 
342  Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act and Natural Fathers Born out of Wedlock Act. 
343  For example, the family advocate can be involved in the following circumstances:  
if there is a dispute between the biological father referred to in s 21(1) and the biological mother of the child with 
regard to the conditions set out in the subsection, the matter must be referred for mediation (s 21(3))  
parental responsibilities and rights agreements must be registered with the family advocate (who must be 
satisfied that the agreement is in the best interests of the child) (s 21(4)-(6))  
the children’s court can further request the family advocate to institute a query and provide a report which set out 
recommendations before it decides a matter (s 50(1)). 
344  The writer visited the offices of the Johannesburg Family Advocate in February 2006. 
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Supporters of mediation state that one of the most highly regarded aspects of mediation is 
confidentiality.345 Without this link there would be no trust and this would not lead to a 
positive atmosphere.346 The assurance of utmost confidentiality encourages open and honest 
discussions.347 The mediator explains, before the mediation proceedings begin, that neither 
the parties nor the mediator may be compelled to divulge any information which has been 
obtained during mediation. The mediator usually compels the parties to sign a pre-mediation 
agreement stating that all negotiations or statements made are “without prejudice” and are 
privileged and confidential nature.348 
In South African law, there is no statutory protection or authoritative privilege for any 
disclosures made in the course of the mediation process. This means that a mediator may be 
called to give evidence in court on issues or discussions that were raised during the course 
of the mediation. The mediator may be compelled to give evidence as the privilege belongs 
to the parties and either may waive that privilege and may compel the mediator to testify.349  
The whole mediation process will fail if the mediator cannot assure the parties that the 
mediation is absolutely confidential. Parties to the mediation will not be open or honest in 
their discussions if the mediator can be compelled to appear in court to act as a witness 
against either of the parties. Settlements will be never be reached if the parties are not 
completely open and honest with each other.350 
It is further pointed out that mediators cannot “guarantee absolute confidentiality” as 
mediators have an obligation to report all criminal acts which have been committed or which 
are to be committed towards an innocent child.351 Pretorius352 sets out clearly that “the 
defence of privilege would not however avail itself in criminal proceedings where the 
mediator may be called upon to give evidence in a criminal court”. 
In terms of section 21(3)(a) of the Children’s Act, it is clear that the mediation as envisaged in 
this section is not confidential as the mediation outcome may be reviewed by the court in 
terms of section 21(3)(b).  
Domestic violence  
There is continuing debate regarding mediation and abuse. Mediation is not appropriate 
where there is a history of domestic violence.353 In mediation, the parties sit in close proximity 
                                                 
345  Goldberg 1998 TSAR 751. 
346  Van Zyl Divorce mediation and the best interests of the child 209. 
347  Pretorius Dispute resolution 76. 
348  Goldberg 1998 TSAR 751; Van Zyl Divorce mediation and the best interests of the child 209; Pretorius 
Dispute resolution 49. In practice, FAAMSA compels the parties to sign such an agreement. 
349  Pretorius Dispute resolution 49. 
350  Goldberg 1998 TSAR 753. 
351  In terms of the Child Care Act and the Prevention of Family Violence Act (Van Zyl Divorce mediation and 
the best interests of the child 210 –211). 
352  Pretorius Dispute resolution 49. 
353  Van Zyl Divorce mediation and the best interests of the child 203 – 204. 
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to one other (mainly in a triangle formation). Many of the victims of domestic violence feel 
completely powerless against the perpetrator. When there is a history of domestic violence 
there is a power imbalance within the relationship.354 Many victims do not report the abuse to 
the authorities and the reason for their presence at the mediation is fear that if they refuse to 
attend the mediation there will be more violence perpetrated355 against them and even 
against the children. It is mainly women and children who are the victims of abuse. Before 
the mediation commences these victims are in a disadvantaged position. These victims will 
agree to whatever the outcome of the mediation will be356 
When the parties attend mediation, they do not always inform the mediator of the abuse. 
Skilled mediators might discern that there is some form of abuse but unskilled mediators are 
unlikely to uncover the abuse.357 The skills and the qualifications of the mediator are of 
utmost importance. 
Cultural and Ethical concerns 
At the Women’s Conference held by the Law Society of the Northern Provinces358 one of the 
major concerns was the lack of black persons in important roles in family law. In terms of 
section 21 of the Children’s Act mediation has been made compulsory. One of the concerns 
relating to mediation was the lack of black mediators. The reason for the concern was that 
parties from a certain ethnic and cultural background would be more comfortable with a 
person from the same ethnic and cultural background who understands the issues affecting 
the parties. However, it does not seem to be possible owing to the lack of mediators which 
come from the same cultural background as the mediating parties.  
For this reason the mediator needs to be trained in cultural awareness359 and needs to 
understand how parties solve disputes in their culture.360 If the mediator understands the 
parties’ culture and ethnic background, the mediation will “succeed in the cultural divide and 
have an outcome favourable to the parties”.361 For example, a conservative Afrikaans-
speaking mediator must be able to mediate between a Venda couple. The mediator would 
need to understand how the Venda culture and the power imbalances work. The Venda 
couple would not automatically open up to the mediator because of the cultural and ethnic 
barrier. However, if the mediator assured the parties of his or her understanding of their 
culture the parties would find it easier to trust the mediator and be open with him/her. 
                                                 
354  Goldberg 1998 TSAR 366. 
355  Van Zyl Divorce mediation and the best interests of the child 205. 
356  Goldberg 1998 TSAR 366. 
357  Van Zyl Divorce mediation and the best interests of the child 205. 
358  On 22 and 23 July 2005. 
359  Goldberg 1998 TSAR 754. 
360  Goldberg 1998 TSAR 756. 
361  Goldberg 1998 TSAR 757. 
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Does the Office of the Family Advocate have the resources to train their staff to be more 
compassionate and have an understanding of the different cultures in South Africa? Are any 
of the parties set out in section 21(3)(a) of the Children’s Act, such as the social worker or 
any other qualified person qualified to deal with the different types of cultures that we have in 
South Africa? Are they trained and suitably qualified? 
Mediator’s neutrality  
The mediator’s main aim is to assist the parties to reach their own settlement. Ideally the 
mediator does not interfere. He or she guides the parties to a decision but does not control 
the outcome. The mediator must be impartial and unbiased. Van Zyl362 posed the following 
question: “Can a mediator be truly neutral?” In my opinion, no person can be truly neutral 
and unbiased. All persons have their own beliefs and attitudes towards what they believe are 
right. The mediator will gear and guide the parties towards what he or she considers to be 
correct and proper.363 Even though a mediator might be considerate or reluctant to air his 
opinion to the parties, the parties will discern the mediator’s views and give them undue 
weight. The parties will consider the mediators suggestions and ultimately take them on. 
Therefore it is not what the party’s desire but what the mediator feels which ultimately 
becomes the “settlement”. 
The family advocate’s role is mainly to evaluate. As set out by Van Zyl, the family advocate 
mediates quite differently to mediators in the normal mediation process. The family advocate 
gets involved and voices his or her own opinion on matters.364 This is contrary to the 
mediation process. This means that the parties will place undue weight on what the family 
advocate’s opinion and suggestions are, instead of coming to a settlement themselves. 
6.4.7 Analysis of section 21(3)(b): Review 
Section 21(3)(b) states that “any party to the mediation may have the outcome reviewed by 
the court”.  
A number of statutes provide for revision of the decisions or the outcomes of statutory 
tribunals or officials by the high court. This is known as statuary review. It appears from the 
terminology set out in section 21(3)(b) that this is what the drafters have foreseen. It does not 
appear from the terminology used in section 21(3)(b) that the word “review” should have its 
ordinary legal meaning, which is “the process whereby the proceedings of the lower courts, both 
civil and criminal, are bought before the high court in respect of grave irregularities or illegalities 
occurring during the course of such proceedings.”365 
                                                 
362  Van Zyl Divorce mediation and the best interests of the child 182. 
363  Burman & Rudolph 1990 SALJ 251 273. 
364  Van Zyl Divorce mediation and the best interests of the child 374. 
365  Harms Civil Procedure in the Supreme Court par R1.  
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Statutory review is review in its widest sense and means to “examine” or “to take into 
consideration”. Harms states that when the court considers a matter already dealt with, the 
court has no restrictions in dealing with the review and it seems that the court’s power’s are 
unlimited.366 Harms clearly sets out that the court:  
“not only possesses the powers of a court of review in the legal sense, but it also has the 
functions of a court of appeal with the additional capacity of being able to, after setting aside the 
decision arrived at by the lower tribunal, to deal with the whole matter upon fresh evidence as a 
court of first instance….Where the determination of a discretionary matter is entrusted by 
Statute to a public official, the High Court will not inquire into the merits of the official if his 
discretion has in fact been exercised, save on special grounds such as mala fides, improper 
motive, exceeding of the discretionary power, non compliance with the statutory procedure, and 
so forth”.367 
It is clear from the above quotation that some form of judgment must have been reached by 
either a public official or a tribunal before it can be referred to review. However, a mediation 
as provided for in section 21(3)(a) of the Children’s Act, is a in simply a meeting between the 
mediator, the biological father of the child and biological mother of the child, with the main 
aim being settlement. A mediator is involved but in my understanding he or she is not 
envisaged as a public official nor is the mediation process envisaged as a statutory tribunal. 
The decision reached at mediation is either settlement or no settlement. The decision 
reached is not a judgment made by the mediator nor does the mediator have the authority to 
make such a judgment. 
It seems illogical to use the wording used by the drafters in this section. Maybe the drafters 
envisaged “review” as the process whereby the matter is taken either to the children’s courtor 
the high court when the parties are unable to reach settlement and a parental rights and 
responsibilities agreement is not entered into in terms of section 22. However, the fact 
remains that section 21(3)(b) is not clear. 
6.5 Section 29: court proceedings 
It would seem to be a logical conclusion that the drafters erred by not referring the matter to 
section 29 in cases where the mediation failed or did not take place.368 Section 29 provides 
that the matter is launched by way of application369 to the high court. The high court will take 
into consideration what would be in the best interests of the child before making an order.370 
If there is an order for guardianship only, there must be reasons why the applicant has not 
                                                 
366  Harms Civil Procedure in the Supreme Court par R6. 
367  Ibid. 
368  S 29(1) of the Children’s Act provides that “an application in terms of section 22(4)(b), 23, 24, 26(1)(b) or 
28 may be brought before the high court, a divorce court in a divorce matter or a children’s court, as the 
case may be, within whose jurisdiction the child concerned is ordinarily resident”. 
369  S 29(1) of the Children’s Act. 
370  S 29(3) of the Children’s Act. 
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moved for adoption of the child.371 When the court considers the application in terms of 
section 29(1) of the Children’s Act, the court must take into consideration the principles set 
out in chapter 2372 of the Children’s Act. The high court may for the purposes of the hearing 
order that:373  
? a report and recommendations be provided by the family advocate, social worker or 
any other suitably qualified person  
? a specific matter be investigated by a person elected by the court  
? a person must appear to give or produce evidence 
? any person is to pay for the costs of the investigation 
The high court may further order that the child must be represented in court proceedings and 
order that either one of the parties pays the costs of such representation.374 In terms of 
section 29(7) of the Children’s Act, if the child is affected by the court proceedings and is in 
need or care and protection, the court must order that the matter must be referred to a social 
worker so that the social worker can determine whether the child is in need of care and 
protection.  
6.6 Section 23: assignment of contact and care to interested persons by order of court 
In terms of section 23 of the Children’s Act, if an interested person would like to obtain 
contact or care of the child, he or she can through an application in terms of section 29, apply 
for contact or care of child. 
Examples of interested persons would be a biological father who does not qualify for 
automatic access under the factors set out section 21(1) or paternal grandparents or 
extended family of the child.  
When considering such an application the court must take into account a number of factors. 
These factors are the best interests of the child, the relationship between the applicant and 
the child and other relevant person, the degree of commitment the applicant has shown 
towards the child, the extent to which the applicant has contributed towards expenses in 
connection with the birth and maintenance of the child, and any other factor that should in the 
court’s opinion be taken into account.  
                                                 
371  S 29(1)(2) of the Children’s Act. 
372  The principles set out in ch 2 of the Children’s Act include: factors to be applied when considering what is 
in the child’s best interests (s 7), the best interests of the child are paramount (s 9), the views of the child 
are given due consideration (s 10), certain factors must be taken into account when dealing with children 
with disability or chronic illness (s 11), dangerous social, cultural and religious practices are prohibited (s 
12), every child has a right have access to information on health care (s 13), every child is entitled access 
to court (s 14), every person has a right to enforce his or her rights or that of a child in terms of the 
Children’s Act (s 15), and every child has a right to have responsibilities appropriate to her or her age 
(section 16).  
373  S 29(5) of the Children’s Act. 
374   S 29(6) of the Children’s Act. 
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The factors set out by this section 23(2) of the Children’s Act are the factors set out by Howie 
JA in B v S.375 It is clear from this section that the common law is confirmed. The criteria 
considered throughout our rich case law from the decision in B v S, will most certainly be 
taken into account by the court when dealing with this section.  
In terms of section 23(3), if during the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court 
that another interested party has brought an application for adoption, the court will request 
the family advocate or social worker or psychologist to institute a query and to furnish it with 
a report and recommendations on what would be in the best interests of the child. The court 
may further suspend the contact or care application until the adoption application has been 
heard. 
Section 23(4) further states that a successful care or contact application will not affect the 
parental responsibilities and rights of another person. 
The whole section 23 is further a replication of the application in terms of the Natural Fathers 
of Children Born out of Wedlock Act. 
6.7 Adoption 
The Child Care Act is repealed by the Children’s Act and adoption of a child is dealt with in 
terms of chapter 15. As far as unmarried fathers are concerned, the adoption proceedings in 
the Children’s Act are similar to those in the Child Care Act. In terms of section 231(1)(d) of 
the Children’s Act an unmarried father may adopt his child.376 Section 233(1)(a) of the 
Children’s Act provides that consent of both parents to the adoption is required.377 In terms of 
section 236(3)(a) of the Children’s Act, the consent of the unmarried biological father is not 
required for the adoption of his child if the unmarried father has not acknowledged that he is 
the biological father of the child. The unmarried father acknowledges that he is the biological 
father of the child if he acknowledges in writing he is the father of the child, if he pays 
maintenance voluntarily or pays damages in terms of customary law, or if he registers his 
particulars when registering the child’s birth. This acknowledgement takes place in terms of 
section 237(4)378 of the Children’s Act. In terms of section 242(1), an adoption order 
terminates parental rights and responsibilities of any person379 who had such rights in 
respect of the child immediately before the adoption. 
                                                 
375  B v S 1995 (3) SA 571 (A) 583. 
376  S 17(d) of the Child Care Act. 
377  S 18(d) of the Child Care Act. 
378  In terms of s 18(d) of the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act, the consent of the 
unmarried biological father is required when he acknowledges himself in writing as the father of the child 
and he has made his identity and whereabouts known. 
379  In terms of s 20 of the Child Care Act an adoption order terminates the rights and obligations between the 
child and any person who was his or her parent prior to the adoption. S 242(1) of the Children’s Acttakes it 
a step further and refers to termination of parental rights and responsibilities of person whilst the Child 
Care Act only refers to the termination of the parents’ rights and obligations. 
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A positive introduction to adoption proceedings is the post-adoption agreement. The 
guardian or parent of the child can enter into an agreement with the new adoptive parents 
before an application is made for the adoption of the child, for contact to the child and to 
obtain information regarding the child. There are conditions attached to this agreement380 
and it will only come into effect if it is made an order of court.381 
6.8 The Children’s Act and the facts of case study  
The respondent and her husband would have applied for the adoption of BD through section 
231(a)(i) of the Children’s Act. For the adoption to proceed, the respondent and her husband 
would of have requested the applicant to give his consent382 in terms of section 133(1)(a) of 
the Children’s Act. The consent of BD would have also had to be obtained if BD was of an 
age, maturity and at a stage of development to understand the implications of such 
consent.383 The applicant would have attempted to enter into a post-adoption agreement with 
the respondent and the respondent’s husband for contact to BD. It is clear from the 
respondent’s non-settlement approach and hard attitude taken, that a post-adoption contact 
agreement would have never been agreed to. 
Due to the position taken by the respondent regarding the post-adoption consent agreement, 
the applicant would not have given his consent to the adoption of BD and the proceedings for 
adoption would have proceeded in terms of Section 239 of the Children’s Act. 
In terms of section 21 of the Children’s Act, the applicant would have automatic full parental 
rights and responsibilities. The applicant believed that he was living with the respondent in a 
life-partnership. The applicant and the respondent were engaged and living together before, 
during and after the birth of BD. Further, the applicant acknowledged himself in writing as 
being BD’s father and entered his name on the birth registry as being BD’s father. The 
applicant contends that he contributed to BD’s upbringing by looking after, bathing, caring 
and feeding BD. The applicant would further have stated that he worked long hours so as to 
provide maintenance for the respondent and BD, as the respondent was not working.  
The respondent would have disputed that the applicant has fulfilled the conditions set out in 
section 21 of the Children’s Act. The respondent would have argued that the parties were not 
living in a life-partnership at the time before, during and after the birth of BD. The respondent 
would have conceded that the applicant acknowledged that he was the father of the child, as 
                                                 
380  The conditions attached to post-adoption agreements are: s 234(2) of the Children’s Act requires that this 
agreement may not be entered into unless the consent of the child is obtained only if the child is of age and 
maturity. S 234(3) of the Children’s Act requires a social worker to counsel parties regarding the post-
adoption agreement and the implications attached thereto. In terms of s 234(4) of the Children’s Act, the 
court must confirm that the post-adoption agreement is in the best interests of the child. The agreement 
must be in the prescribed format (s 234(5). 
381  S 234(6) of the Children’s Act. 
382  The consent of the unmarried father is required in terms of s 236(3)(a) of the Children’s Act, when he has 
acknowledged paternity of the child. 
383  S 233(1)(c)(ii) of the Children’s Act. 
The position of unmarried fathers in South Africa: an investigation with reference to a case study 
- 58 - 
there is a birth certificate in which the applicant acknowledged that he is the father of BD. 
The respondent would further have argued that the applicant did not contribute to BD’s 
upbringing as the applicant spent long hours at work, at race meetings and did not spend any 
time with BD. The respondent would have disputed that the applicant provided maintenance 
for BD, as soon after BD’s birth, the respondent had to return to work so as to ensure that BD 
was adequately maintained. 
The respondent would have continued to deny the applicant access to BD and the applicant 
would have no option but to refer the matter for mediation for the parties to discuss what is in 
dispute and to attempt to reach some form of settlement. The applicant’s main aim is obtain 
contact to BD. 
The adoption proceedings would have continued in the children’s court and the applicant 
would have continued to withhold his consent and vigorous defend the adoption of BD by the 
respondent’s husband.  
If the adoption is granted, which it most likely will as there is no evidence to indicate that the 
adoption is not in the best interests of BD, the applicant cannot continue with his application 
in terms of section 21 or 29 of the Children’s Act, as the applicant’s parental rights and 
responsibilities would have been terminated.  
The applicant would have requested the respondent and her husband to enter into a parental 
rights and responsibilities agreement384 only with regard to contact to BD. Due to the stance 
taken by the respondent and her husband, this request would have been denied. 
The applicant would have no choice but to bring an application for contact in terms of section 
23 of the Children’s Act. The criteria used to determine whether the applicant would be 
entitled to such contact to BD, is the same criteria used in B v S.385 The court will consider 
factors such as the applicant’s financial support of BD, pursuing contact, keeping with 
arrangements, being present at the child’s birth, being named on the birth certificate, 
developing a relationship with BD, and the reasons for the application in terms of section 23.  
The section 23 application for contact will be brought in terms of section 29 and the family 
advocate, social worker, social services professional or any other qualified person would be 
called upon to provide a report and to produce recommendations. The applicant would have 
been placed in the position that he would have been in under the Natural Fathers of Children 
Born out of Wedlock Act and the common law. The criteria provided in B v S386 is considered. 
However, the best interests criterion, as set out in section 7 of the Children’s Act is 
considered paramount.  
                                                 
384  In terms of s 22 of the Children’s Act. 
385  B v S 1995 (3) SA 571 (A) 582. 
386  B v S 1995 (3) SA 571 (A) 582. 
The position of unmarried fathers in South Africa: an investigation with reference to a case study 
- 59 - 
Due to the criteria set out in section 7 of the Children’s Act, it is the writer’s belief that the 
strategy that would have been taken by the respondent would have been to have BD 
psychologically tested in an attempt to prove to the court that BD’s psychological make-up 
would not have been able to deal with the applicant having contact with BD or the applicant 
gradually coming part of BD’s life. This would be rebutted by the applicant, who would have 
his own psychologists indicating that BD does not have a delicate psychological make-up. 
The respondent would also focus on the altercations between the applicant, the respondent 
and the respondent’s husband, to indicate that the applicant is violent, exposed the child to 
violent behaviour and that his behaviour has continued even after the respondent and BD left 
Zimbabwe. 
Unless the high court will take a more lenient approach, the writer does not believe that the 
applicant would be successful in his contact application to BD. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The Children’s Act is an exciting piece of legislation, especially for unmarried fathers, as the 
common law and the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act did not protect 
these fathers’ rights adequately. When reading section 21 of the Children’s Act, it is clear that 
unmarried fathers, who conform to a certain criteria, automatically have parental rights and 
responsibilities in respect of their children. However, when scratching the surface of this 
section, one starts to realise the problems associated with the section. Further, when one 
starts applying the common law, current law and the Children’s Act to case studies, one 
starts to realise that the law hasn’t changed, especially for in cases where the biological 
mother or adoptive parents have taken the hard-line approach of “no settlement”. The legal 
fraternity representing unmarried fathers expected a complete change in direction of the 
current law. The application for contact is similar to that of the current law, so is the 
evidentiary burden. Needless to say, the impact of the Children’s Act in the writer’s opinion is 
disappointing. 
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